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Overview
The Central Border Region of 
Ireland / Northern Ireland
The eight Member Councils areas of the Central Border Region 
include Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon; Fermanagh and 
Omagh; Mid Ulster and the counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, 
Monaghan and Sligo. The Region had a population of approximately 
850,000 in 2011. This is a predominantly rural area, characterised 
by a dispersed population and distance from major urban centres. 
Approximately one third of the population live in settlements over 
1,500 population; and two thirds in smaller settlements and open 
countryside. The Region accounts for 20% of the land area of the 
island of Ireland, with a high quality landscapes of coastline, lakes, 
inland waterways and hills.
After generations of severe social, political, and economic challenges 
in the Central Border Region, not to mention the experience of violent 
conflict, the 21st century has begun to prove the viability and value 
of cross-border cooperation. Unremarkably and uncontroversially, 
cross-border connections have become a means of overcoming the 
dual challenges of underdevelopment and geographical peripherality. 
Economies of scale, small-step exports, social enterprise, cross-
community projects, tourism initiatives, even bargain hunting -– 
in the past fifteen years, habits of cross-border movement have 
been developing that have brought evident and practical gain. The 
European Union helped to create an environment that made such 
contacts easier; indeed, it did a great deal to encourage it, as per the 
logic of the Single Market, legislative harmonisation and the European 
Regional Development Fund. Political parties of all hues have come to 
encourage local communities and businesses in the Border Region to 
make the most of such opportunities. 
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The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will constitute a major change to the 
context for such relationships across the border. As such, the Central 
Border Region is the area most exposed to the risks of Brexit, for the 
impact of any divergence between the UK and Ireland will be felt 
most acutely at the Irish border. Although the nature and extent of any 
changes are as yet unknown, the very prospect of them is already 
having an impact in the Central Border Region. The purpose of this 
small-scale research project was to give a voice to members of local 
communities on both sides of the border in this Region, to better 
understand the potential and actual impact of Brexit even at this early 
stage.
Responding to Brexit
The research for this report was conducted in the summer of 2017, 
some four months after the triggering of Article 50 by Prime Minister 
May and after just one round of the Brexit negotiations. Although the 
Irish border had already been identified by the EU and UK as one of 
the top three issues for negotiation (along with citizens’ rights and 
financial liabilities), the position papers from the UK government and 
the European Commission on Ireland/Northern Ireland had not yet 
been published at the time of this research. Whilst the political parties 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland had set out their positions on Brexit (with 
strong policy differences evident between Unionism and Nationalism 
on the issue), there was as yet no development of a common approach 
to Brexit in Northern Ireland beyond the OFMDFM letter to Theresa 
May in August 2016. 
This report thus constitutes a snapshot of the perception and 
anticipation of Brexit from the Border Region one year on from the June 
2016 referendum but before much progress had been made in the 
negotiations. The focus on the movement of people and goods in the 
survey responses reflects the main issues raised in media coverage 
of Brexit. The possible fallout from Brexit for the peace process was 
also frequently mentioned. Other practical concerns were raised by 
individual participants, including diverging environmental standards, 
specialised healthcare provision, shrinking recruitment pools, the loss 
Executive Sum
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of EU funding (including CAP), tourism decline and tariff barriers. Just as 
our research reflects the complex links across the border that make up 
everyday life and practice in the Region, we found that anticipation of 
the possible impact of Brexit on any aspect of cross-border movement 
has ramifications for several others. These local-level concerns contrast 
with the high-level picture of trade opportunities and Treasury savings 
presented by Leave supporters. We give space to both in this report. 
The study
The online survey and focus groups were used in this research to 
better understand the nature of cross-border movement in the Central 
Border Region now alongside the anticipated effects of Brexit from the 
perspective of local communities. It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
report on the potential impact of Brexit across a range of sectors but 
rather an opportunity to record the views of local communities who are 
‘bordering on Brexit’ in a very literal way, from both sides of the border.
The survey received over 300 responses [n=305] from across the 
eight local authority regions of the Irish Central Border Area Network 
(Armagh City Banbridge and Craigavon; Cavan; Donegal; Fermanagh 
and Omagh; Leitrim; Mid Ulster; Monaghan; and Sligo). Most of our 
respondents are in full-time work and aged 31-64. They come from both 
sides of the border and constitute balanced representation from the 8 
local authority areas of ICBAN. There was an under-representation in 
our sample of those with British citizenship and those who voted Leave 
in the 2016 Referendum. Approximately 60% of our respondents had 
a vote in the June 2016 referendum. Of those who exercised this right, 
1 in 6 voted for the UK to Leave the EU, which is not representative of 
the actual result of the referendum in the relevant Northern Ireland 
constituencies. This disparity may be because those most motivated 
to respond to a survey on Brexit were likely to be Remain voters and 
concerned to express their views. That said, from our focus groups it 
was clear that pro-European and Remain voters are just as keen as 
Leave voters to find ways of ensuring the best possible outcome, and 
avoiding unnecessary disruption or risk, in the process of Brexit for 
their local communities and the Border Region. 
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Key Findings
This project contains eight core findings regarding the views of 
local communities in the Central Border Region towards Brexit that 
should be highlighted at this critical time:
1. The Central Border Region is most 
exposed to the impact of Brexit
1.a. The Border Region has experienced the most 
long-lasting economic and social consequences 
of partition and violent conflict, exacerbated by the 
‘back-to-back’ development of Northern Ireland 
and Ireland. Respondents describe the Region 
as ‘marginalised’, ‘deprived’, ‘isolated’ and ‘on the 
periphery’.
1.b. Through the creation of economies of scale, 
productive networks, resource-sharing and joint 
initiatives, cross-border cooperation has been 
one means of addressing the particular needs of 
the Central Border Region. Respondents identify 
cross-border cooperation as a sign of the changing 
fortunes of the Region. 
1.c. Any change to the status of the border or ability to 
easily cross the border will have the most direct 
impact on residents in the Border Region, on 
both sides of the border. This in a Region where 
development and cooperation is greatly needed.
1.d. One respondent noted: ‘Cooperation is based 
partly on goodwill and ease of access to one 
another’s jurisdiction and both these qualities 
could be seriously diminished by a hard Brexit.’ 
(#251, M, Fermanagh and Omagh)
2. The legacy of conflict 
2.a. The legacy of violent conflict is apparent in the 
fears that people have about the impact of Brexit 
on the border. For many respondents, the very 
term ‘border control’ is one that conjures images 
of a securitised border and recalls deeply negative 
experiences and community tensions. 
Executive Sum
m
ary 
Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 13
2.b. The emotional and psychological (as well as social 
and political) significance of the border should 
not be underestimated. As one respondent put it, 
‘hardening the border is like opening a wound’.
2.c. Physical or material manifestations of border 
control would not only be targets for paramilitary 
activity but would stand as a symbol of regression 
in cross-border and British-Irish relations.
2.d. Above EU membership, most respondents credit 
the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement with 
fundamentally changing their experience of 
crossing the border and facilitating cross-border 
cooperation. 
3. The effects of Brexit are already being 
felt in the Central Border Region 
3.a. Brexit is already having an effect in respondents’ 
comfort in living on one side of the border and 
working on the other, in their confidence in doing 
business on the other side of the border, and in 
their view of the UK as a welcoming place for 
residence/work/study for Irish citizens.
3.b. Respondents suggest that the different high-
level political responses to Brexit – Unionist and 
Nationalist, British and Irish – are beginning to 
have a ‘polarising’ effect at a community level in 
the Border Region. 
3.c. Frontier workers and some businesses are already 
feeling the effects of Brexit, particularly in the 
exchange rate. Some respondents have already 
decided to move to the other side of the border 
in anticipation of future difficulties in cross-border 
work. 
3.d. Remain voters and those in the southern border 
counties view Brexit as risking the ‘reimposition’ 
of a hard border as a consequence of British 
government policy. In contrast, Leave voters are 
more likely to see imposition in the form of EU ‘red 
tape’; they see Brexit as an expression of democratic 
freedom and Parliamentary sovereignty. 
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4. Leave and Remain voters differ in their 
anticipation of a hard border
4.a. The vast majority of respondents (94%) expect to 
be personally affected to a considerable degree 
by Brexit. 73% of respondents believe that Brexit 
will affect their local community ‘to a great extent’.
4.b. The predominant hope (whether they be Leave 
or Remain voters) among respondents regarding 
the post-Brexit border is that there would be 
minimal disruption and change to the border as it 
is currently experienced.
4.c. There is no significant difference between 
respondents in different jurisdictions (Northern 
Ireland or Republic of Ireland) as to the emphasis 
they place on the border in the anticipated impact 
of Brexit. 
4.d. There are sharp differences in views about the 
significance of Brexit for the border. Leave voters 
are less likely to fear a hard border – not because 
they don’t cross it or see the economic value of 
an open border – because they are less likely 
to believe that negotiations will result in such an 
outcome (largely due to the position of the Irish 
government).
5. There seems to be a paradox in the contemporary Irish 
border: crossing the border is both unremarkable and 
extraordinary. In some ways it is non-existent, completely 
irrelevant; however, in other ways it is ever-present 
and at the centre of politics, economics and peace
5.a. The most significant aspects of EU membership 
for our respondents are, by far, EU citizenship 
rights and EU funding. Beyond this, the majority 
of respondents credit EU membership with 
direct, tangible benefits; many of these could be 
compromised through Brexit (e.g. workers’ rights, 
environmental protection).
5.b. Cross-border workers are especially conscious of 
the importance of EU membership for them and 
feel particularly anxious about the potential impact 
of Brexit on them. 
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5.c. Cross-border connections have been carefully 
fostered; they are still far from secure and concrete. 
The informal, relational links formed as an indirect 
consequence of EU projects or joint initiatives 
are those most easily broken but most vital to 
‘normalisation’ and trust-building. 
5.d. Many respondents expressed the view that they 
would avoid crossing the border, or do so less, 
should there be any difficulty or obstacles in the 
future. This relates in part to the evocation of the 
‘border of the past’ when it comes to anticipating 
any border controls or restrictions. 
6. The overwhelming sense is one of uncertainty; 
this is not a good thing in a Border Region with 
a legacy of conflict and under-development
6.a. Accurate information on Brexit is particularly vital for 
residents of the Border Region – not just because 
they will be so directly affected by any significant 
change and will need to prepare for it, but also 
because these residents are so particularly aware 
of the negative effects of a ‘hard’ border.
6.b. There is a conundrum faced by local representatives, 
in wanting residents to prepare for Brexit but in not 
wanting to risk (a) growing north/south polarisation 
or (b) unnecessary anxiety or disruption.
6.c. Brexit has evoked strong emotions among people 
who would otherwise describe themselves as 
having little interest in politics. Respondents 
describe feelings of anger, annoyance, resentment, 
fear, anxiety, confusion, helplessness, and 
devastation. 
7. Brexit is exacerbating the sense of marginalisation 
and invisibility felt by residents in the Central 
Border Region, in both jurisdictions
7.a. Respondents who anticipated negative impacts 
from Brexit tended to show much less confidence in 
the current democratic system and in the capacity 
for the representation of the views of the Border 
Region. 
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7.b. This is also true of voters in Northern Ireland (both 
Unionist and Nationalist) who expressed concerns 
about the lack of representation in the absence of a 
sitting Assembly/Executive and concerns about the 
representation of Northern Ireland in Westminster 
(especially if Direct Rule was reintroduced).
7.c. The survey reveals acute anxiety among some 
respondents in the southern border counties, 
especially those who work or trade on the other 
side of the border. The fact that they did not have a 
vote in the referendum and yet are deeply affected 
by its outcome exacerbates their concerns.
7.d. The sense of having no voice further deepens 
concerns and has a destabilising effect. 
Communities in the Border Region are wary of 
future arrangements being ‘imposed’ on them with 
no local input nor accommodation of local needs.
8. There is a risk of return to back-to-back development
8.a. Opportunities expressed for the Border Region/
Northern Ireland from Brexit tend to be framed as 
being at a cost to the other, i.e. NI/UK benefiting 
at the expense of the Republic or the southern 
border counties seeing opportunities arising from 
difficulties in NI/UK. 
8.b. There is a profound risk of a re-emergence of 
‘back-to-back development’ even in anticipation of 
Brexit. This may come at a micro-level in the form 
of people deciding to avoid crossing the border. It 
may also come in the private sector, as economic 
opportunities come in competition with those 
on the other side of the border. Or it may come 
as a result of reduced funding for cross-border 
initiatives (e.g. in the absence of Interreg funding 
from the European Regional Development Fund).
8.c. It is critical that cross-border bodies and forums 
receive investment rather than divestment at 
this time, not least to help prepare for a smooth 
transition to post-Brexit cross-border relationships 
and to minimise the risk of a sharp decline in market 
integration.
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8.d. Without careful protection of its common interests, 
the Border Region is at risk of being simultaneously 
the Region most deeply affected by Brexit and 
least closely protected by measures put in place by 
London, Dublin or Brussels to mitigate its effects.
Looking Ahead
As the border looks set to take on even more material, legal and 
economic significance come March 2019, it is important that the 
views and needs of the Central Border Region are taken into account. 
We would hope that these views might yet inform decision-making 
on the nature of the UK’s Withdrawal Agreement and future UK-EU 
relationship, as well as policy-making for the future of the Region. 
We also hope that it will inform the representation of peoples in this 
Region beyond party political, local or sectoral priorities and enable 
better preparation for Brexit among communities in the Region as 
a whole. 
Just as political leadership in both governments have emphasised 
that they wish to avoid any return to a hard border on the island 
of Ireland, so too is it imperative that the benefits of cross-border 
cooperation in the Central Border Region are preserved and 
protected during and after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Amid 
current uncertainties and political differences, there remains a 
widely-held commitment across local communities and groups 
around the Region to continue working together to preserve 
the gains already achieved and to realise potential benefits for 
future generations.
Section 1:  
The Central Border Region
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1.1. Particular history, 
particular needs
When the UK leaves the European Union, the 500km border that 
runs across the island of Ireland will become an external boundary 
of the European Union. What this will mean in practice is subject to 
both the British withdrawal ‘Brexit’ negotiations under Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union and the contents of any agreement 
on the future UK-EU relationship. A so-called ‘hard Brexit’ would 
mean that the Irish border would be a frontier to the free movement 
of people, goods, services and capital that is a feature and condition 
of EU membership. This would mean deepening difference in 
experience on either side of the Irish border. This is a particular 
concern in the Irish Border Region, on both sides, which is where 
the benefits of carefully-fostered, mutually beneficial cooperation 
have been most valued.
The Irish border divides the historic province of Ulster, several 
parishes, and even some individual homesteads between the states 
of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The failure of governments 
on both sides to address the unintended socioeconomic 
consequences of the 1921 drawing of the border was worsened by 
decades of neglect – the effects of which were most acutely felt by 
the communities living most proximate to the border. Yet the socio-
economic impact of the border pales in comparison to the human 
cost of the violent conflict associated with its contestation. The 
legacy of conflict has forced a lop-sided process of borderlands 
integration. When combined with the centralised nature of 
governance and administration in Ireland and Northern Ireland, it 
is clear that local cross-border cooperation has continually had to 
work against the flow.
A so-called ‘hard 
Brexit’ would 
mean that the Irish 
border would be 
a frontier to the 
free movement 
of people, goods, 
services and capital 
that is a feature 
and condition of 
EU membership.
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1.1.1. Effects of division 
and peripherality
Cross-border cooperation has been used as one means of 
addressing the particular needs of the Central Border Region – 
needs which can be summarised in terms of its demographic deficit, 
rurality, geopolitical peripherality and structural deprivation. Detailed 
analysis at the turn of the millennium showed the concentration of 
material deprivation in the District Electoral Divisions closest to the 
borderline.1 As a number of our survey respondents eloquently 
expressed, even in the present day the material effects of being a 
Border Region are tangible: 
‘This is a deprived area: socially, in terms of infrastructure, and of 
course because of the Troubles.’ (#276, M, Derry)
‘We have a Region with an older population, weaker infrastructure, 
very few large and strong multinationals, [and] a dependence on 
agriculture and local services – and these are the sectors that are 
very vulnerable.’ (#67, M, Mid Ulster)
The demographic deficit can be observed in both the low levels of 
population density and the relatively low levels of population growth 
in the Central Border Region. Given the ageing population of the 
border counties, the demographic deficit represents a threat to the 
long-term sustainability of the Region’s communities. Unfortunately, 
the resultant lack of agglomerated economies in small border towns 
and villages further spurs the outmigration of skilled labour towards 
those more developed urban centres with concentrations of higher 
value-added industries. There are low rates of urbanization in the 
Central Border Region relative to the rest of the country. This not 
only limits the number of towns available to facilitate economic 
development but also contributes to low levels of employment in 
1 Price Waterhouse Coopers (2003) Mid-Term Evaluation of Interreg IIIA - Final Report. 
Belfast: Special EU Programmes Body.
Cross-border 
cooperation has 
been used as 
one means of 
addressing the 
particular needs 
of the Central 
Border Region
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technical and professional occupations.2 This dispersion of the 
borderlands populace also contributes to the demographic basis 
for its geopolitical peripherality. This works at two levels. First, the 
physical and cognitive distances between borderland communities 
and their metropolitan centres of governance and commerce; 
secondly, the challenges they have faced in attracting investment 
away from the Dublin-Belfast and, to a lesser extent, Derry-
Letterkenny development corridors.3 
The legacy of peripherality is also reflected in the constraints faced 
by local communities in the Central Border Region in accessing 
essential features of structural development for economic prosperity, 
such as public transportation networks, wide tertiary education 
options, and advanced communications infrastructure. From a public 
administration perspective this can be easily understood in terms of 
public service providers’ difficulties in achieving economies of scale 
in small and physically dispersed communities. This public policy 
challenge is openly recognized in the Northern Ireland Department 
for Infrastructure Regional Development Strategy 2035.4 On the 
southern side, the scale of the challenge is revealed in the fact that 
the area formerly known as the Border, Midland and Western region 
suffered the 8th worst performance among 284 NUTS II regions in 
Europe (2007-2015), in a 21% drop in GDP.5
2 Roper, S. (2006) ‘Cross-border and local cooperation on the island of Ireland: an economic 
perspective’. Mapping frontiers, plotting pathways, Working Paper 7. Belfast: Queen’s 
University Belfast. 
 Roper, S. (2001) ‘Innovation, networks and plant location: evidence for Ireland’, Regional 
Studies 35(3), 215-28
3 Wilson, T. (2000) ‘The obstacles to EU regional policy in the Northern Ireland borderlands’, 
Human Organisation 59(1), 1-10.
4 Department for Infrastructure, Northern Ireland. (2012) Regional Development Strategy 
2035: Building a Better Future. Belfast: Crown Copyright.
5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Eurostat_regional_yearbook
public service 
providers’ 
difficulties 
in achieving 
economies of 
scale in small and 
physically dispersed 
communities.
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1.1.2. Market integration
This resource deprivation underscores a fiscal/economic deficit 
exhibited across the borderlands. Although violent conflict had a 
depressing effect on economic development until the 1990s, market 
integration was actively pursued by Irish and UK governments by the 
1970s – particularly during the pre-1973 EEC accession period.6 The 
removal of duties and protectionist policies finally eliminated the 
price distortions seen in many common consumer goods, reducing 
the profitability of smuggling operations that had continued across 
the physical border since its inception.7 The introduction of EEC 
regulations on customs declarations in 1987 had immediate effect on 
the ease with which goods could be transported across the border. 
A few years later, the creation of the Single Market erased many 
obstacles to cross-border trade and economic development, and 
customs posts on the border were immediately made redundant. 
This led to a brief export boom as Northern Ireland’s exports to 
both Ireland and to Europe expanded dramatically.8 Yet the Border 
Region still suffered ‘growth lag’ during the Celtic Tiger boom period 
of the 1990s/early 2000s.9 This is in part because there remained, 
despite the central role businesses played in pushing for market 
integration, a significant integrative deficit within the private sector 
in the Border Region.10
6 Bielenberg, A., and Ryan, R. (2012) An Economic History of Ireland since Independence. 
New York: Routledge.
7 Harvey, B. (2005) The Emerald Curtain: The social impact of the Irish border. 
Carrickmacross, Co. Monaghan: Triskele Community Training and Development.
8 Murphy, M. C. (2014) Northern Ireland and the European Union: The dynamics of a changing 
relationship. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
9 Harvey, B. (2005) The Emerald Curtain: The social impact of the Irish border. 
Carrickmacross, Co. Monaghan: Triskele Community Training and Development.
10 Hayward, K. and Magennis, E. (2016) ‘Peace and the private sector: Northern Ireland’s 
regional experience of globalised trends’, in T. J. White (Ed.) International Relations Theory 
and Northern Ireland. Manchester University Press.
 Hayward, K. and Magennis, E. (2014) ‘The Business of Building Peace: Private Sector 
Cooperation across the Irish Border’, Irish Political Studies, 29(1), 154-175.
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The influx of external capital through inward investment after the 1998 
Agreement brought an impressive spurt of economic development 
to the island – though the lion’s share of this ‘peace dividend’ was 
enjoyed largely within the Dublin-Belfast development corridor.11 For 
the borderlands Region as a whole, the most direct ‘peace dividend’ 
was felt with the completion of the de-securitization process in the 
early 2000s. Added to this, the EU helped create, support and fund 
networks and programmes across and through the Border Region, 
helping to ameliorate some of the negative legacy of the border 
whilst facilitating closer integration of economies on either side. 
Yet levels of local inter-firm co-operation across the border remain 
much lower than levels of inter-firm co-operation on the same side 
of the border.12
11 Poole, W. (2004) ‘Where Now for the Belfast - Dublin Economic Corridor?’ Centre for Cross 
Border Studies: Year 5. Armagh: CCBS.
12 Roper, S. (2006) ‘Cross-border and local cooperation on the island of Ireland: an economic 
perspective.’ Mapping frontiers, plotting pathways, Working Paper 7. Belfast: Queen’s 
University Belfast.
1.2. Cross-border 
cooperation
1.2.1. The origins of cooperation
Cross-border cooperation has thus had to work against the 
background of a stark integrative deficit in the Border Region, with 
differences in policy and administration across the border hindering 
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co-operation in both public and private sectors.13 In the public 
sector, local cross-border co-operation was not even considered 
in the public sector until the mid-1970s and the Irish borderlands 
were not seen as a distinct region by either national governments 
until the 1980s. Indeed, there has been a gap in regional-level 
policy-making, and even those local authorities proximate to the 
border were not incentivised to consider policies beyond the remit 
of their local constituencies. When they have done so, however, the 
achievements have been considerable. The work of ICBAN (Irish 
Central Border Area Network) as well as that of EBR (East Border 
Region) and the North West Strategic Growth Partnership exemplifies 
the benefits that can come through Region-wide cooperation.
ICBAN was formed in 1995 as a local authority-led cross-border 
development organisation. Initially set up to provide a forum for 
networking amongst Councillors and Council Officials from across 
the border region, the organisation’s role has developed in the 
intervening period and changed, responding to the cross-border 
challenges and opportunities of the time. The organisation is now 
working with local authorities and other stakeholders in an innovation 
development role with a focus on strategic priorities across 
infrastructure connectivity, creative industries and rural development. 
This includes a leading role in creating cross-border synergies on 
broadband telecommunications, having been empowered by local 
authorities of the area to identify solutions in progressing connectivity 
investments in the Region. The organisation has directly levered over 
€50 million in funding to the area and has been a catalyst in helping 
lever major investments in a number of connectivity projects on roads 
and telecommunications.
By joining up the Regional stakeholders and playing to the strengths 
of the Central Border Region, cross-border groups such as ICBAN 
have been able to attract significant EU-funded investment into the 
Region towards the development of strategic cross-border initiatives. 
13 Arthurs, P. (2015). ‘The Local Authority-Led Cross-Border Groups: an early example of cross-
border best practice along the Ireland/Northern Ireland Border area?’, The Journal of Cross 
Border Studies in Ireland. Vol. 10. Armagh: Centre for Cross Border Studies.
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Some of the most effective examples of this investment in the Central 
Border Region occurred under the EU Interreg IVA Programme 2007 
– 2013 (from the European Regional Development Fund). These 
included the Innovation Enterprise Programme (IEP), a £3.8m project 
built on the relationship between Omagh Enterprise Company and 
the Leitrim Local Enterprise Office in working together to successfully 
deliver cross-border business support programmes. The £1m Higher 
Attainment Through Cross-Border Hubs (HATCH) project supported 
and developed entrepreneurship in the Central Border Region and 
delivered targeted accredited training to key groups. Finally, the 
Border Uplands Project (£3.1m project value) deployed cross-border 
co-operation approaches to develop the Central Border Region as a 
world class geo-tourism and recreational destination. 
In order to be delivered successfully, such projects necessarily entail 
joint structures, such as in marketing, education and management. 
Participants in this research study explained how funding for projects 
such as these have a greater impact than merely the specific 
programme output:
‘I’ve been on the Interreg Monitoring Committee and that’s another 
example of the relationships and opportunity to build relationships 
and see the other person’s point of view, to see the wider angle in 
the two jurisdictions’. (3.29.46)
‘I also do a lot of community work and have been involved with 
European projects. Such projects are an excellent way of networking 
and sharing skills and information. Much of the funding also comes 
from Europe and [Brexit] will be a great blow to those who currently 
benefit from these programmes.’ (#110, F, Fermanagh and Omagh)
1.2.2. Added value 
of cooperation
Another aspect of cross-border cooperation is in the Memorandums 
of Understanding between local authorities on each side of the 
border. As one Councillor said, this means that ‘they don’t do 
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anything in isolation – they run it past their other partners in 
the wider Region. All those things help considerably.’ (3.30.25). 
Another recalled a vivid example from a cross-border regional 
project showing the ways in which joint initiatives at Council level 
can filter down to make a valuable, albeit informal, contribution to 
peace-building and trust-building:
‘The Marble Arch Caves Geopark in Fermanagh and Omagh is 
the first transnational geopark in the world. It was the legacy of 
Fermanagh Council and Cavan Council [working together]. The 
relationships around the table are one thing, but then there’s the 
events that happen in conjunction with them, so you’re going to 
social events and you’re bringing your husband/wife/partner – 
barriers break down and relationships build.’(3.30.48)
The International Centre for Local and Regional Development 
(ICLRD) and the Centre for Cross Border Studies (CCBS) offer several 
studies of how ‘softer,’ practical cross-border cooperation have 
benefited groups across all sectors (businesses, regional health 
authorities, local councils) and promoted better relations between 
communities. ICBAN’s Regional Strategic Framework 2013-2027 
recognises the added-value that cross-border cooperation activity 
can continue to bring by: 
 X Gaining critical mass, working together and sharing resources 
on a cross-border basis (for example in providing innovation 
support for trade between businesses in the Region); 
 X Tackling issues arising from the presence of the Border 
(such as the weaknesses in the roads, telecoms and energy 
infrastructure in the vicinity); 
 X Making the case to the two Governments and the EU for 
investment in the area on a consistent and evidence-informed 
basis.
Yet the sustainability of the work of cross-border groups such as 
ICBAN is threatened by a financial crisis. Not only are many of these 
cross-border groups heavily dependent on EU Interreg funding for 
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operations, but the constraints of the post-2008 austerity programme 
in both the UK and Ireland have also left local authorities with 
shrinking resources from which to commit to these collaborative 
forums. Even aside from Brexit, the levels of local cross-border 
public sector co-operation achieved face challenges if they are to 
avoid slipping back into a state of baseline disintegration. In sum, 
despite significant efforts and advances, the border continues to 
exercise a disintegrative influence over local public and private 
sector actors within the Central Border Region. Unless active efforts 
are made to protect and sustain cross-border cooperation, there is 
a risk that the practical gains achieved through it for all communities 
over the past 20 years could rapidly retreat. 
1.3. Facing Brexit
The Central Border Region is already conceived by a number of 
respondents as a ‘marginalized’ or ‘neglected’ area. Despite the 
successes and achievements of recent cross-border cooperation 
detailed in this report, this enduring sense of isolation exacerbates 
many of the concerns that residents have around the potential impact 
of Brexit; it also dampens some of the perceived opportunities that 
may be more apparent in urbanized, better-connected locales. As 
a focus group participant commented:
‘These things are going to be driven from the capital cities and 
if they are driven from these places, the supports may not be 
relevant for us in this Region and supports could be somewhat 
diluted by the time they get as far up the country.’ (1.33.06)
It is notable that the majority of benefits or opportunities from Brexit 
that were identified by respondents (even Leave voting respondents) 
tended to be framed as benefits for the UK (or Republic of Ireland) 
as a whole, or to be quite general Leave arguments, rather than 
specifically relevant to the Border Region.
The unique position of the border counties are that they are in 
a ‘liminal’ zone between the UK and Ireland. In the past, this has 
meant that they are on the periphery of policy making and political 
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interest in both Westminster and Dublin. With that border becoming 
an EU/UK border, the concern of the border area is that it becomes 
even further from the centre of decision-making (especially in the 
absence of a functioning devolved Assembly and Executive in 
Stormont). The Border Region is thus at risk of being the Region 
most deeply affected by Brexit and least closely protected by 
measures that may be put in place by London or Brussels to mitigate 
its effects. However, this particular position also puts it at the cutting 
edge of the new relationship between the UK and European Union. 
This could mean acting as a bridge between the two. It is clear 
that a pull to either Dublin or to London merely stretches and 
exacerbates divisions within Northern Ireland. Instead, cross-border 
cooperation takes on a new symbolic and practical significance in 
this environment of uncertainty. 
It is possible that the Central Border Region could get the best of 
both worlds after Brexit; this would require a commitment of policy-
makers to thinking in terms of mutual benefit and collaboration 
rather than competition and divergence. The challenge now, then, 
is to find a social and economic strategy for the Border Region as 
a whole – one that stands as a sustainable alternative to impeded 
dialogue, back-to-back development, competition and market 
disintegration, and one that is Brexit-ready.
The Border 
Region is thus 
at risk of being 
the Region most 
deeply affected by 
Brexit and least 
closely protected 
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may be put in 
place by London 
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mitigate its effects. 
However, this 
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2.1. Purpose
14 For example, Ulster University Economic Policy Centre (October 2017) Brexit and the Border 
Corridor on the Island of Ireland: Risks, Opportunities and Issues to be Considered (http://
www.fermanaghomagh.com/app/uploads/2017/10/171012-Brexit-report-FINAL-version.
pdf); Ulster University Economic Policy Centre (2017) Initial Analysis of the Challenges and 
Opportunities of Brexit for the Derry City & Strabane and Donegal County Council areas –
 The North West City Region (https://www.derrystrabane.com/getmedia/f1f1bbb6-e336-4acf-
9fd9-5e1e171fe43f/Initial-Analysis-of-the-Challenges-and-Opportunities-of-Brexit-for-the-
North-West-City-Region-150217.pdf); Centre for Cross Border Studies (August 2017) Brexit 
and Economic Development, EU Referendum Briefing Paper 5 Update (http://crossborder.
ie/site2015/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/UpdatedEUReferendumBriefingPaper5_Final.pdf); 
InterTrade Ireland (May 2017) British Exit from the European Union: Case Studies (http://
www.intertradeireland.com/researchandpublications/publications/publications/name-42572-
en.php) [all accessed 20.10.2017).
ICBAN developed a Policy Paper on Brexit in March 2017, noting 
the differing political positions on the Board. The agreed position 
was that the organisation would work to highlight any opportunities 
or concerns and to help withstand any negative consequences 
arising from the process. Whilst the Board recognised that there 
was a programme of civic dialogue led by the Irish government, 
they identified an absence of local community consultation on 
both sides of the border. As a result this initiative was conceived 
between ICBAN and Queen’s University Belfast. We see this 
study as complementing the excellent recent research conducted 
on Brexit along the border and border corridors, by presenting 
the view of local communities and concentrating on the Central 
Border Region.14
It is in keeping with the policy of ICBAN to help withstand any 
negative consequences on the social and economic life of the 
Central Border Region. This study’s main aim was to identify 
problems, issues and possibilities from the process of Brexit for 
people living in rural communities on both sides of the Central 
Border Region – particularly from the perspective of ‘ordinary 
citizens’ whose lives will be most affected by any change in the 
nature of the border. This study has a particular emphasis on the 
experience of rural communities in Armagh City, Banbridge and 
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Craigavon (ABC); Cavan; Donegal; Fermanagh and Omagh; Leitrim; 
Mid Ulster; Monaghan; and Sligo. 
The project has been determinedly non-political and non-partisan. 
The aim of ICBAN was simply to gather the views of local people 
who will be directly affected by any change that Brexit evokes 
(especially on the border). In order to do so, we used two means 
of gathering data: an online survey and focus group interviews. 
The research was conducted in accordance with guidelines and 
procedures for research ethics of Queen’s University, including 
gaining approval from the relevant committee on research ethics in 
advance of the research. As part of this, all participants in the focus 
groups received an information sheet and signed a consent form. 
2.2. Methods
2.2.1. The survey
The online survey was promoted and distributed through social 
media and online forums (such as via a blogpost on brexitborder.
com) and through notices given by ICBAN and its member authorities 
(see the flyer in Appendix One). The initial aim was to get 150-200 
responses for this survey; in the end, 305 people completed the 
survey, which was distributed via a link to an online platform. The 
survey distribution was not managed in such a way as to ensure 
random distribution and representative results, but the use of 
several targeted rounds of promotion ensured that we have a fairly 
balanced representation of respondents from across the different 
local authority areas that constitute the Central Border Region. 
It is important that the survey is not taken as a representative sample 
from the Region, as this was not the primary purpose of the exercise. 
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Instead, through the use of several open questions, we sought to 
give residents in the Region an opportunity to express their views 
on the potential impact of Brexit, particularly in relation to cross-
border movement and relations. The qualitative data illuminates our 
understanding of some of the interests, issues and valid concerns 
of residents on both sides of the border. 
The survey contained a series of 26 questions, most of which used 
a single tick-box option or a Likert scale to register responses. It 
also allowed respondents to comment further on the topic of the 
section and we encouraged respondents to do so. A list of the 
survey questions is available at the end of this report (Appendix 
2). Most of the open-ended questions received brief responses; 
some participants were very generous with their time and took the 
opportunity to write several hundred words of text. The first sections 
of the survey established general characteristics of the participant 
(gender, age, district of residency etc.), how frequently and why 
they cross the border, the ways in which EU membership currently 
affects them, and their views and expectations regarding Brexit. 
The survey was completely anonymous unless people decided to 
leave their email address and/or phone number to either receive 
a copy of the findings, or to take part in one of the focus groups. 
Before analysis began, the data from the survey was separated from 
any email addresses divulged. The quotations used in this report 
are referenced using the number allocated to the anonymous 
completed survey return, the gender, and the local authority area 
of the respondent (e.g. #247, F, Cavan). We have made minimal 
adjustments to spelling and grammar in the quotations where 
absolutely necessary for the sake of clarity.
2.2.2. The focus groups
The focus groups were composed of respondents to the survey 
who volunteered to participate in this further exercise, along 
with representatives of tenant businesses and organisations at 
Monaghan M:Tek and Enniskillen Business Centre where the focus 
groups were held. There was also a focus group of local Councillors, 
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who between them represented each one of the participating 
authorities and each of the following parties: DUP, Fine Gael, 
Sinn Féin, and the Ulster Unionist Party. The focus groups were 
conducted in ‘neutral’ spaces in Monaghan town and Enniskillen. 
Due to time constraints, we were not able to arrange to interview all 
the people who had offered to participate in a focus group. We are 
hoping to amend this in future research that builds on this project. 
The focus groups were centred upon a schedule of questions (see 
Appendix 3), but the discussion was managed in such a way so as 
to enable follow-up and elaboration of new areas for conversation 
as they naturally arose. The focus groups are referenced here in 
terms of the number and the time-marker for that quotation in the 
transcript, e.g. [Group]1.15 [mins].21[seconds].
2.3. The survey 
respondents
2.3.1. Area of residence
We were pleased to get a fairly even balance of respondents 
across the eight local districts that make up the ICBAN region. 12 
per cent of respondents came from outside these districts; of these, 
most were from Derry City and some from Newry/Mourne/South 
Down region. The most sizeable group of respondents came from 
Fermanagh and Omagh, a large local district. Five respondents 
were not resident in the Border Region (e.g. Limerick, Galway, 
Dublin, Causeway and Glens) and these responses, although read 
closely, have been excluded from analysis included in this report in 
order to hold true to the primary focus of this report, i.e. the Central 
Border Region. 
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Fig. II.i. Responses to Q.4. Area of residence of respondents.
2.3.2. Profile of respondents
The majority of the respondents were in the age range of 46-55 
years old, with 31-45 years as a close second. Together they make 
up over 83% of the responses. The third biggest group consisted 
of the age range 18-30 years old, followed by those over 66 years 
old; only a handful of the responses were under 18 years old. There 
was an almost equal distribution of male and female respondents.
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Fig. II.ii. Responses to Q. 1. Age.
Fig.II.iii. Responses to Q. 2. Gender.
Over 80% of our survey respondents are in paid employment, and 
most of them on a full-time basis. The remaining 20% are constituted 
from a nearly equal mix of students, retirees, and those who are 
not currently in paid employment. Although the topics of agriculture 
and the agrifood sector are often mentioned in the responses to 
later survey questions, only 1 in 5 of our respondents actually work 
in industries directly related to agriculture or rural affairs. 
Bordering on Brexit36
Se
ct
io
n 
2:
 T
he
 S
tu
dy
 
Fig. II.iv. Responses to Q. 5. Occupational Status.
2.3.3. Citizenship
Given the complexities of nationality and national identity on this 
island, the question we asked kept it as simple as possible, asking 
for respondents’ ‘Citizenship’ and giving them a choice from a set 
selection: British, Irish, British and Irish, other dual citizenship, other 
citizenship. We know that this would not have been only interpreted 
as being about the passports or birth certificates people hold. This 
is possibly why the results from this diverge somewhat significantly 
from those in the 2011 Northern Ireland and 2016 Ireland censuses 
when it comes to the proportion saying they are both ‘British and 
Irish’ citizens (which, at 12%, is almost more than six times the figure 
from the 2011 Census in Northern Ireland). Most participants either 
hold Irish citizenship or consider themselves to be Irish (including 
those from Northern Ireland). It is striking that a substantial proportion 
of those saying they are both British and Irish are resident in the 
border counties in the Republic of Ireland. We do not have enough 
data to extrapolate any firm insights from this, although it is notable 
that those living in the Republic of Ireland who claimed both ‘British 
and Irish’ citizenship were more likely to have pro-Brexit (or even 
‘Irexit’) views. 
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The proportion of respondents who hold either British citizenship 
only or both British and Irish citizenship are approximately the same. 
Of those with British citizenship only, approximately 1/5 lived on the 
southern side of the border. There is almost an equal breakdown 
in the number of British respondents who voted Leave and those 
who voted Remain in the Brexit referendum. Around a quarter of 
our survey participants holding British citizenship claimed to cross 
the border at least once a week or more; this compared to around 
60% of participants holding Irish citizenship. 
There were only a few respondents who held non-British and non-
Irish citizenship. In sum, the survey contains a disproportionate 
representation of Irish citizens. We cannot assume that Leave 
respondents in this survey hold British citizenship, nor, indeed, that 
respondents from the Republic of Ireland hold only Irish citizenship. 
Fig. II. v. Responses to Q. 3. Citizenship
The 2011 Census results returned the following from areas covered 
by the ICBAN/QUB survey in terms of those predominant national 
identity (note that this is not the same as citizenship): 
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District Irish British District Irish British 
Armagh 44.4 32.4 Fermanagh 36.1 37.2
Banbridge 16.2 61.1 Magherafelt 42.7 31.4
Craigavon 48.3 25.6 Newry and 
Mourne
53.0 20.2
Cookstown 33.5 37.3 Omagh 40.9 28.6
Derry 55.0 23.7 Strabane 39.2 33.0
Dungannon 38.8 30.9
Fig. II.vi. Predominant national identity (2011 Census returns, Northern Ireland)
2.3.4. Brexit vote
42% of the respondents did not have a vote in the Brexit referendum; 
most of these reside south of the border (but there were more than 
a dozen residents in the Republic of Ireland who had a vote, a 
few of whom voted Leave). Of those who did vote, the majority of 
respondents in this survey voted to remain. This is not an accurate 
reflection of the entire vote in Northern Ireland; we therefore make 
no claims that this research can give a comprehensively detailed 
representation of the spectrum of opinions towards Brexit held by 
those in the Border Region. Because such a small portion of our 
respondents are Leave voters (8% compared to 47% Remain) then 
their views have been given a somewhat disproportionate amount 
of attention in our analysis compared to the response rate. As an 
aside, it is worth noting that approximately 1/6 of the Leave voting 
respondents in this survey hold Irish citizenship. 
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Fig. II. vii. Responses to Q. 7. How did you vote in the referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU in June 2016?
The Leave vote in the constituencies covered by the ICBAN/QUB 
Brexit survey was as follows: 
Constituency % Leave vote Constituency % Leave vote
Foyle 21.7 Mid Ulster 39.6
South Down 32.8 Fermanagh and 
South Tyrone
41.4
West Tyrone 33.2 Upper Bann 52.6
Newry and 
Armagh
37.1
Fig. II.viii. The percentage Leave vote in the 2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership 
of the European Union in Northern Ireland constituencies in the Central Border Region
We should reiterate before concluding this Section that this study 
is merely an exploratory one, intended to offer illustrative rather 
than quantifiably representative results. We have analysed the data 
to present the most predominant themes, together with additional 
indications of points raised by several respondents. Given the 
modest scale of this project, we neither claim – nor seek – to give 
voice to every survey respondent or focus group participant. 
Bordering on Brexit40
Se
ct
io
n 
2:
 T
he
 S
tu
dy
 
We do hope, though, that in encouraging discussion of the views 
from the Central Border Region that this project helps create the 
conditions in which a wide range of perspectives will be considered 
in preparing for the effects of Brexit for the Border Region.
Section 3:  
The Border
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3.1. The Border 
conundrum
‘I think of barriers when I think of Brexit’ (2.0.37)
When it comes to anticipating the impact of Brexit, the border is 
front, left and centre of most responses in this study. The point that 
comes out clearly from this research is that this Region has been 
most severely affected by the border (‘having witnessed first-hand 
its impact’ [#242]). That said, evidence from our study indicates 
that our respondents do not necessarily consider themselves as 
living beside or close to a border (notwithstanding the half dozen 
responses who specify how many metres they live from the border); 
rather, they consider themselves as living in a Border Region. For 
some this, in their mind, incorporates areas on both sides of the 
border, for others it is very much on one side. Overall, it felt odd for 
many to discuss the border as an object because it is simply not a 
consideration in people’s everyday geographies. 
Respondents explained that, as things currently stand, the decision 
as to which side of the border to shop on, for example, depends on 
what one wants to buy or whom one wants to meet; whether it is the 
northern side or the southern side only comes into consideration 
in terms of the currency and price difference. Nevertheless, the 
profile given to the border in the Brexit debate means that they 
are increasingly likely to make associations of this with their worst 
experience of the pre-Single Market, pre-Agreement border. This 
mix of the mundane and the extraordinary significance of the border 
is encapsulated in the comments of one young survey respondent:
‘[A hard border] would be a Nightmare, politically, socially. It 
would seriously affect my daily routine, and my faith in the peace 
process.’ (#155, M, Leitrim)
To raise the spectre of disruption to cross-border cooperation and 
movement – making it a politically significant or practically demanding 
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task, rather than an ordinary, simple task – does further disrupt the 
ground on which the peace is founded. This was expressed very 
powerfully by a participant in a focus group in Monaghan:
‘Even the psychological impact - the re-awareness and the re-
awakening of the border. Everyday I’m now thinking ‘what’s going 
to happen?’ (1.22.22)
The fragility of the peace process is an immediate concern for many, 
especially when combined with acknowledgement of the lack of 
progressive politics in Northern Ireland: 
‘People have entrenched positions, heightened emotions on 
something that hasn’t been dealt with, even from a legacy point 
of view. We’re still on the path to reconciliation and this is like 
opening a wound.’ (1.25.25)
Concerns about the peace process were wrought together with 
concerns about Brexit-induced change for the Border Region. As 
one respondent holding both British and Irish citizenship put it:
‘I would prefer that Brexit didn’t go ahead because the North 
is a powder keg already without dragging the nationalist 
community out of the EU to be a part of the UK and nothing else’ 
(#261, F, Monaghan)
Leave voters were much more likely to see EU membership as an 
imposition and Brexit as an expression of democratic freedom. This 
is a fundamental difference between the two positions and one that 
can only be resolved through clear information, transparency in 
decision-making and accountability as principles of governance in 
the Border Region after Brexit. 
‘...the re-awareness 
and the re-
awakening of 
the border.’
‘We’re still on 
the path to 
reconciliation 
and this is like 
opening a wound.’
‘...the North is 
a powder keg 
already...’
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3.2. Legacy of conflict, 
fragility of peace
3.2.1. Psychological and 
emotional dimensions 
of the border
Despite Prime Minister May’s reassurances that ‘no one wants to 
a see a return to the border of the past’, responses to this survey 
repeatedly express the fear that a hard border will take the border 
area back to the situation as it was during The Troubles, i.e. a 
militarised border. This is a theme that naturally came to the fore in 
the focus groups, on both sides of the border.
‘Mentally, [the border conflict] has had a huge bearing on the 
identity of the people. Cavan, Louth, Donegal – 500 yards to your 
right could be danger, but to your left, you’re ok. That constant 
warfare mentality wears you down. As well as the physical danger.’ 
(1.19.12)
It is against this background that such negative associations with 
border controls are rooted in both communities, on both sides of 
the border.
‘There was a fear when you got to the checkpoint – you didn’t 
know if you were going to get hauled out of the car. When people 
think of the border, that’s often where they go in their minds.’ 
(1.4.32)
It is clear that for residents in the Border Region, the very concept 
of a ‘hard border’ is one that conjures up memories and fears 
of a militarised, securitised border. One respondent explained 
this vividly: 
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‘I grew up a stone’s throw from the border. I remember 22 mile 
detours to go 4 miles up the road. I remember the militarisation of 
border crossings and the closure of roads. I remember how few 
services we had and how difficult it was for people to survive. We 
were completely terrorised by the British military. I never ever want 
to see that again and we should never go back to that.’ (#284, F, 
Fermanagh and Omagh)
It should be noted that physical or material manifestations of border 
controls are undesirable not only because they could be targets 
for paramilitary activity but because they would stand as a stark 
reminder of painful, traumatic experiences and also as a symbol of 
regression in cross-border relations. As noted above, the lifting of 
border controls and free movement across the island has been an 
integral part of the peace process.
Beyond this, and more difficult to explain but equally important are 
the psychological dimensions to the configuration of the border. 
Such psychological aspects are entirely understandable in a post-
conflict context and they need to be handled with sensitivity. It is for 
these reasons that Brexit may be seen to have ramifications for the 
peace process itself; peaceful, unremarkable border crossing has 
been a hugely important part of conflict transformation. One focus 
group participant explains this well: 
Particularly [after] 10 years working together, people [in the Border 
Region] have seen what life is like for normal people and they 
don’t want to lose that. People are annoyed, concerned, confused 
and getting angry. The impact on border communities has not 
been taken into account. (1.25.25)
This quotation reiterates the point that cross-border contact has 
a rare quality in the Border Region – something quite different 
to contact across the Channel. Contact is part of a process of 
‘normalisation’ – one that has been facilitated by EU membership. 
This is not to say that this cannot be continued after Brexit, but 
the importance of those social, personal contacts – the ones that 
don’t have an economic value or material presence – for the peace 
process is clear. 
the importance 
of those social, 
personal contacts 
– the ones that 
don’t have an 
economic value or 
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– for the peace 
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3.2.2. Importance of the 
1998 Agreement
Most respondents credit – not the Single Market or EU membership 
– the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement with fundamentally changing 
people’s experience of crossing the border.
‘I travel more now. It’s much easier to cross now than when I was 
growing up. The GFA changed all that immensely.’ (2.6.52)
One focus group participant elaborated on the importance of the 
peace process for border crossing: 
‘I wouldn’t be living here if it wasn’t for the GFA. I moved in 2000 to 
the border area. I am back and forth [across the border] every day 
and the idea of a border in the north is just terrifying. If I’m queuing 
and don’t know how long for, it’s going to be almost impossible 
to run my business from Enniskillen. I would close my business if 
there was a hard border.’ (2.6.52)
A survey respondent concurs:
‘I have lived on the border for several years. Peace in the 
community and easy daily access are reliant on an almost non-
existent border. The introduction of a hard border would create 
agitation, annoyance and dissent.’ (#295, F, Monaghan)
We see in such extracts the connections made between the 1998 
Agreement and the ease of moving and working across the border 
now – and anxiety at potential disruption to this. A number of 
respondents talk about the ‘them and us’ attitude that contributes 
to the conflict and that was worsened by the existence of a hard 
border. A focus group participant goes further:
the connections 
made between the 
1998 Agreement 
and the ease 
of moving and 
working across the 
border now – and 
anxiety at potential 
disruption to this.
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for the GFA.’
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‘The ‘them and us’ complex could be very quickly re-established if 
there is difficulty and restrictions on movement. That movement 
starts with social and extends into business. This forum [ICBAN] and 
other cross-border forums have broken down barriers and personal 
relationships have established as a result of this.’ (3.27.12)
A number of respondents connected the expectation of restrictions on 
cross-border movement with resonances of conflict. One described 
an impact of Brexit on them personally as being a ‘sense of fear and 
intimidation’ (#43, F, Leitrim). 
3.3. Crossing the 
border today
3.3.1. Frequency of crossing
Over half of the survey respondents cross the border at least once a 
week (some daily or even several times a day). This figure is more or 
less the same for respondents on either side of the border. This has 
much to do with living in the Border Region itself. One participant in a 
focus group commented that road networks now meant that one can 
cross the border several times on a journey: 
‘For those of us that live near the border, it has to be crossed. They 
recently closed the roads near where I live for roadworks and I counted 
that, [following the alternative route] I crossed the border 12 times. So 
if there was a physical border that would be a nightmare.’ (2.7.37)
There are only a handful who cross the border ‘rarely’ and it is 
notable that none of the respondents said that they never cross the 
border at all.
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Fig. III. i. Responses to Q. 8. How often do you cross the border?
3.3.2. Purpose of crossing
As to why people cross the border frequently or very frequently, the 
main reasons are social reasons (e.g. 52% of respondents do so 
[very] frequently to meet family and friends) and for shopping (45% 
[very] frequently). This is followed by about 40% of our respondents 
doing so frequently for work/business and about 38% for sport/
entertainment and holiday/travel. The least common reasons that 
people cross the border was for education (this is not surprising, 
given the age profile of the respondents) and healthcare. That 
said, 9.2% said they frequently or very frequently cross the border 
for Education/Studies, and 10.5% said they cross for healthcare 
(very) frequently. 
the main reasons 
are social reasons 
(e.g. 52% of 
respondents do so 
[very] frequently 
to meet family 
and friends) and 
for shopping (45% 
[very] frequently).
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Fig. III. Ii. Responses to Q. 9. How frequently do you cross the border for…?
Many respondents, in their comments, mentioned the fact that they 
have family members on both sides of the border; a few shared 
that their partner lives on the other side of the border to them. One 
respondent in particular articulates the type of social and familial 
ties that exist across the border: 
‘My family is split across both sides of the border. I have 50 first 
cousins with approximately half on each side of the border. I am a 
member of some literature groups and they regularly meet on both 
sides of the border. I use the libraries in both Derry and Letterkenny. 
My house is literally 250 metres from the border across the fields. 
Everything I do crosses the border. My bus to Letterkenny crosses 
the border to go to Derry first, then back across the border to 
complete its journey to Letterkenny. The border going back up, 
will affect every single aspect of my life in a negative manner.’ 
(#279, F, Donegal)
Another, also with family on both sides of the border, recalls how 
different border crossing used to be in the past compared to now:
‘My father is from Monaghan and my mother Armagh; I spent 
most of my childhood passing back and forth through the border 
several times a week visiting my grandparents and cousins. I’m 
from North Monaghan which the border surrounds in all directions 
so I have vivid memories of regularly passing through check 
‘Everything I do 
crosses the border.’
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points and customs a many times a day - sometimes through a 
checkpoint to do a five minute message and back through again 
on the return journey. I would be devastated if we returned to this 
type of system; I would feel like the country would go back 20 
years. I can’t begin to imagine not only the inconvenience of it but 
the thought that we are once again separated by a border run by 
army and customs officials… It is ridiculous to think we’re having to 
consider it.’ (#238, F, Monaghan)
We were able to discuss the experience of crossing the border 
in more depth in the focus groups. These conversations revealed 
the paradox of the contemporary border. In some ways it is non-
existent, completely irrelevant and not a consideration in daily life:
‘Yes, the decision is to shop in Armagh or Dundalk, but the border 
doesn’t come into it.’ (1.7.53)
‘Not sure that people are even aware they are crossing the border 
for shopping or whatever – I don’t think about it.’ (1.7.53)
In other ways, however, the border is ever-present, particularly as 
linked to politics and the experience of the peace process.
3.4. Anticipating a 
‘harder’ border
3.4.1. The impact south 
of the border 
A border not only divides, it is a meeting point – what happens on 
one ‘side’ of the border invariably affects experience on the other. 
In other ways, 
however, the 
border is ever-
present, particularly 
as linked to 
politics and the 
experience of the 
peace process.
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This is powerfully illustrated in the case of a referendum with such 
significant implications for the economic, social, legal and political 
environment of a country. For a Border Region, the ramifications 
are particularly acute – the more integrated a Border Region, the 
weightier the implications. Responses to some of the questions in 
this project have brought this to the fore in several ways.
‘Both sides of the border… it’s a community. In Belfast/Dublin, 
certain sectors may be impacted and others might never be. Within 
the local border community, it’s everyone that will feel it.’(1.20.02)
‘For a border community, it impacts on every aspect of everyday 
life. When you get up in the morning, which road do you go out on? 
In Dublin or Belfast they won’t understand. That very close, tight 
way that it affects everything you think about and everything you 
do. For example, the man that fixes my car lives in Newtownbutler, 
County Fermanagh – to drive you’d go out the Cavan road into 
County Fermanagh, then into County Monaghan, then into County 
Fermanagh – then you get to his house. I could do that journey in 
10 or 15 minutes; what would that be like if crossing an international 
European border?’ (1.20.20)
Respondents from Donegal are particularly concerned, given 
its geographical position and reliance on routes of transport that 
traverse the border:
‘The vote for Brexit was essentially a vote to turn my county 
[Donegal] into a peninsula. We are already cut off from our natural 
urban centre by partition. Any hardening of that line would be 
economically disastrous for my local area.’ (#73, M, Donegal)
‘From a Donegal perspective, the key word is isolation. Where we 
are…on the periphery of Europe. 95% of our land border is with 
the north. The logistics of any sort of restrictions on the border – 
whether that is form-filling, e-forms or queues at the border, it is 
going to have huge implications for industry and for people that 
cross the border for work, for education, for health.’ (3.18.33)
‘For a border 
community, it 
impacts on every 
aspect of everyday 
life. When you get 
up in the morning, 
which road do 
you go out on?’
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‘I have relatives in Scotland, England and Northern Ireland. The 
closest shopping town is across the border. Most employment 
locally is on the other side of the border in Derry.’ (#279, F, Donegal)
The fact that these respondents did not have a vote in the referendum 
and yet are deeply affected by its outcome means that the feelings 
of resentment, anxiety and voicelessness are particularly acute 
among respondents in the southern border counties. 
‘We (in the Republic of Ireland) didn’t have any say and we’re 
going to be equally affected. People face the same issues on both 
sides of the border.’ (1.31.16)
‘We are being dragged out by the coat-tails by essentially England 
and Wales. It’s galling that we’re getting pulled out, given the 
amount of people who decided to stay. We’re constrained by 
the GFA in one way and enhanced by it in others. We’re caught.’ 
(1.34.50)
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3.4.2. Ramifications of 
a ‘harder’ border
Fig. III. iii. Responses to Q. 11. How much do you think a ‘harder’ border between Ireland 
and Northern Ireland would affect you? (Likert scale)
Almost 85% of the respondents believe that a harder border between 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland will significantly affect 
them. When asked to anticipate what a hard border might mean, 
focus group participants recalled such border experiences and the 
impact it can have.
‘[A harder border] creates a number of problems and has massive 
ramifications, not just in terms of where roads are closed off, but 
emotionally. When you think about where you go shopping, where 
you trade. People here would’ve headed east rather than west; 
with Sligo just down the road, you would go to Craigavon. That 
emotional relationship with a border, in terms of where you think 
you’re going to go has much longer impacts. It doesn’t matter if 
they build [physical] barriers, the fact that they create some form 
of border…that’s what divides families and communities.’ (2.9.16)
‘Paperwork barriers, people barriers, travel barriers, education 
barriers. [Brexit] Just makes everything more complicated and 
less seamless.’ (2.1.15)
‘It doesn’t matter if 
they build [physical] 
barriers, the fact 
that they create 
some form of 
border…that’s what 
divides families 
and communities.’
‘...emotional 
relationship 
with a border.’
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Given the symbolic, political and emotional significance of the 
border, it is not surprising that many respondents draw direct links 
between the future nature of the border and relationships across 
the three ‘strands’: Unionist/Nationalist, north/south, and British/
Irish. To illustrate this, we draw here on extensive comments from 
a British Unionist and Irish Nationalist who live in the Fermanagh 
and Omagh district. They have different experiences of the border 
and different viewpoints on the Union. It is worth quoting them at 
length as they reveal some of the concerns raised by the spectre 
of a harder border.
‘Whilst a hard Border may not affect my life in terms of commuting 
I believe any form of a hard border will have an adverse effect 
on relations here between Unionists and Nationalists, particular in 
the border regions. As someone who lives in a border area I have 
witnessed how contentious simply erecting KM/H [kilometres per 
hour road speed signs, used in Republic of Ireland] and “Welcome 
to Northern Ireland” signage has been in particular rural areas. 
These are always quickly defaced or removed. I cannot for the 
life of me imagine what erecting physical signs of a border … 
by establishing border infrastructure or border forces would 
have on community cohesion and the continued acceptance by 
Nationalists of the current constitutional position [given that they] 
believe their Irishness is underpinned by membership of the EU 
and an invisible border.’ (#211, M, Fermanagh and Omagh)
‘I have the right as an Irish citizen to travel across my country 
unhindered and unrestricted by a border - of any description. I 
am concerned at the delays people will face crossing the border, 
whether all of the border crossings will remain open - which will 
cut off whole families, and that this reinforces partition on this 
small island. I am worried about businesses in the small border 
villages and the larger towns that will be starved of trade that any 
restriction may cause and the consequential effect this will have on 
our already struggling communities. I am worried that our sporting 
clubs won’t be able to field teams after everyone has to emigrate 
when there’s no work here. I’m worried that our communities will 
be devastated by this. (#284, F, Fermanagh and Omagh) 
‘...any form of a 
hard border will 
have an adverse 
effect on relations 
here between 
Unionists and 
Nationalists.’
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3.4.3. The optimistic view
Of course, the fact that an open border is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, with only the youngest generations having no 
recollection of a ‘hard border’, means that there is already 
considerable experience of having dealt with such difficulties. In 
light of this, the notion of the Border Region as being characterised 
by resilience and adaptability came to the fore in some of the 
discussions regarding how Brexit may be managed: 
‘The services/products that are here now will remain and that’s 
not going to change. We will adjust to what the new demands 
are.’(2.28.03)
‘Whatever you have to do, you have to do. People will change and 
it will become the new norm. We are quite resilient and we’ll just 
get on with it.’ (1.11.30)
It is also the case that 8% of our respondents said that a harder 
border would affect them only a little or not at all. Within this group, 
there was a mix of British and Irish citizens and residents on both 
sides of the border; all but one of these was a Leave voter. Indeed, 
as noted below, the trend among our small sample of Leave voters 
was to be rather more confident than Remain voters that there will 
not be a hard border. As one put it: ‘Why does everyone who is 
opposed to Brexit think there will be a hard border?’ (#8, M, Mid 
Ulster). This is partly because of the view that any harder border 
would be Ireland (rather than Britain’s) problem, so the EU would 
be pressurised to avoid it: ‘The border is more a problem for 
Southern Ireland than Northern Ireland’ (#18, M, Armagh). Others 
argued that concerns about Brexit overplayed the importance of EU 
membership: ‘There was life before the EU and there will be life 
afterwards’ (#21, M, Fermanagh and Omagh). 
One Leitrim-based respondent argued that there could not be a 
hard border because to enforce one would push Ireland towards 
leaving the EU itself:
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‘Business will demand that there is no hard border. People and 
communities will insist there is no hard border. We will not be 
bullied as we were with Lisbon. If Brussels does pay heed, Irexit 
will follow. It will probably happen anyway.’ (#27, M, Leitrim)
The same respondent was very clear that reform of the EU was 
necessary and that Brexit reflected Britain’s standing up to ‘Brussels 
imperialism’. This is an interesting perspective from the southern 
Border Region: 
‘We will not tolerate abuse of our community by Brussels. We had 
enough crap from British security - and it had an excuse due to IRA 
activity.’ (#27, M, Leitrim)
Aside from the sentiment of the respondent, this comment reveals 
a sense in the Border Region that it has suffered the most from the 
hard edge of forceful polices on all sides.
Section 4:  
Anticipating Brexit
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4.1. Experience of 
EU membership
4.1.1. Effects of EU membership
The survey asked respondents the extent to which they considered 
themselves and their household affected by EU membership across 
a range of different policy/legislative areas. It is clear from this 
response that by far the most significant areas in which respondents 
consider EU membership to affect them are in EU citizenship rights 
and in EU funding. 
After these, the main ways in which respondents believe themselves 
to be affected at least ‘quite a lot’ by EU membership are in relation 
to holiday/travel (78%), work/business (75%), shopping and retail 
(75%) and environmental protection (73%). The areas in which 
respondents are least likely to consider themselves affected by EU 
membership are Education and Fisheries policy; this reflects the 
fact that only a small portion of our respondents are students (7%) 
and the small size of the fisheries sector in Ireland/Northern Ireland, 
so its needs are not properly represented in this survey. 
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Fig. IV. i. Responses to Q. 15. In what ways does EU membership currently affect you 
and your household…? (Likert scale)
What this means is much of the experience of the European Union 
is not only related to travel abroad and to rights but also to very 
local experience, especially when it comes to direct funding and to 
matters that entail cross-border activity. In Section II, we noted the 
importance of shopping/retail as a motive for crossing the border, 
and ¾ respondents also see EU membership as being important 
in this area. In this way, the lines between the experience of EU 
membership and the ease and experience of crossing the border 
can be blurred. 
‘EU membership is such an intrinsic aspect of life now that it, in 
one way or another impacts our daily life.’ (#177, M, Donegal)
‘EU Membership affects all aspects of my life, my family and 
my household from Energy Directive to food prices to worker 
protection’ (#181, M, Fermanagh and Omagh)
‘European Union is embedded in our law and culture’ (#183, M, 
Fermanagh and Omagh)
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4.2. Significance 
of Brexit
4.2.1. Impact on individuals
Fig. IV. ii. Responses to Q. 17. How much do you think the UK leaving the EU will affect 
you and your household? (Likert scale)
97% of our respondents (from both sides of the border) said that 
they would be personally affected by Brexit. 82% said they would 
be significantly or majorly affected by Brexit. Those who did not 
expect to be affected by Brexit tended to be older (‘Won’t affect 
me personally a lot, as I am retired’) or they had a sceptical view 
of the media coverage of Brexit (‘There will be an impact, some 
pros and cons but its impact is being hyped up’). Leave voters 
were disproportionately represented in the number of respondents 
saying that they would not be affected at all by Brexit. One such 
respondent said that he believed Brexit would not affect him 
because he believed the future of Northern Ireland was ‘covered 
by GFA [Good Friday Agreement]’ (#7, M, Mid Ulster). 
82% said they 
would be 
significantly or 
majorly affected 
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Fig. IV. iii. Wordcloud of answers to Q18 on effects of Brexit on personal life/household. 
Of those who saw Brexit as having a significant personal effect 
on them, many mentioned the wider British-Irish context, such as 
anticipated changes to the position of British passport holders in 
Ireland and vice versa, and the importance of travel between Great 
Britain and Ireland. In light of this, it would seem that the preservation 
of the Common Travel Area is very important for people in the 
Central Border Region when it comes to managing the effects of 
Brexit. Travel across the border with ease and the anticipation of 
other forms of border control were very frequently mentioned as 
explanations for the anticipation of being personally affected by 
Brexit. The connection of cross-border movement to ‘everyday life’ 
was very apparent, with shopping, sports, holidays, entertainment, 
business and relationships mentioned frequently in this regard. 
Beyond border-centric issues, there were a wide range of 
reasons offered as to the ways in which respondents anticipated 
being significantly personally affected by Brexit. A businessman 
commented: ‘Will limit my business development opportunities, 
remove development grants and limit my free movement.’ (#58, M, 
Newry, Mourne, Down). Others mentioned the loss of EU funding: 
Farm support payments, Rural Development Programme monies, 
PEACE funding. A range of other points were raised including 
employee protections, trade, tourism and agriculture standards. 
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Not all those who anticipate Brexit affecting them to a great extent viewed 
this as a negative thing. One commented by way of explanation: ‘Great 
to have rid of the EU, bureaucracy, we can make our own decisions’ 
(#8, M, Mid Ulster); this was echoed by another: ‘Life will be a lot better 
the EU has too much say in our affairs and not for the good’ (#16, M, 
ABC). It is important to recognise that these views were not exclusively 
those of Leave voters with only British citizenship or resident in Northern 
Ireland. A Leitrim resident (with joint citizenship) added: ‘[Brexit] will be a 
tremendously positive influence because we desperately need reform 
in the EU and only Britain has the ability to stand up to EU imperialism.’ 
(#27, M, Leitrim). And an Irish citizen in Cavan commented: ‘The UK will 
be a better place after it leaves EU’ (#9, M, Cavan).
4.2.2. Impact on 
local community
Figure IV. iv. Responses to Q. 19. How much do you think the UK leaving the EU will 
affect your local community and Region? (Likert scale)
It is notable that a larger proportion of the respondents thought 
that their community would be greatly affected by Brexit than they 
themselves would be.
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This centres on the importance of the border for the Region. Issues 
raised include cross-border shopping, travel, trade, and social 
connections. Others mention particular risks for particular sectors, 
and the loss of EU funding is mentioned most frequently as a 
particular concern.
‘Community and voluntary sector will be hit badly, especially with 
good relations/cross community work and programmes’ (#286, F, 
Fermanagh and Omagh). 
Some of the fears expressed by respondents were generally those 
regarding the UK’s exit from the EU, e.g. ‘we will all be poorer, less 
healthy, and dependent on the unstable/ dangerous US to come 
in and “help” us with trade deals that will make us even poorer’ 
(#285, F, Fermanagh and Omagh). More common, though, were 
concerns about the exposure of Northern Ireland and the Border 
Region to new risks outside the ‘cushiness’ provided by the EU. ‘We 
have had it good for quite some time – no wonder they [England] 
are not worried about us’ (2.29.39). 
Some describe the anticipated effects of Brexit in emotive terms; 
in fact, as noted in the previous section, some of the most urgent 
expressions of anxiety about the effects of Brexit on the local 
community come from those on the southern side of the border. 
For example:
‘I live in a border town. It will be devastating’ (#293, F, Monaghan)
‘I live in Carrigans in County Donegal. The border will sever our main 
transport links, access to shopping and access to employment.’ 
(#279, F, Donegal)
‘Devastation. Isolation’ (#296, M, Monaghan)
‘Currently barely surviving due to falling exchange rate and cannot 
sustain this. I am looking for alternative employment in Donegal 
(next to impossible) and also getting my house ready to put on 
market so [Brexit is] a life changing event that I was unable to 
voice an opinion on!’ (#281, F, Donegal).
some of the most 
urgent expressions 
of anxiety about the 
effects of Brexit on 
the local community 
come from those 
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‘We share most of our border with N Ireland so our trading will be 
affected by customs, charges, cross-border workers, immigrants, 
work opportunities.’ (#141, F, Donegal)
It is evident that those that see Brexit as having most consequence 
for their locality, tend to emphasise the border and to anticipate 
its ‘return’. One person, when asked about the impact of Brexit, 
commented: ‘border of the ‘70s’ (#297, M, Newry). There appears 
to be no significant difference between respondents in different 
jurisdictions as to the emphasis they place on the border in the 
anticipated impact of Brexit. 
Fig. IV. v. Wordcloud of answers to Q20 on effects of Brexit on your local community or 
region. 
A little over 6% of the respondents believe that Brexit would hardly 
affect their local community and region. Looking at the reasons they 
gave for this view, it centres on the idea that things will either stay 
the same or improve. These respondents ridiculed what they saw as 
scaremongering from the ‘doomers and gloomers’ and welcomed 
the removal of ‘unelected bureaucrats’. Other improvements that 
they anticipated were to be the reduction of red tape, retention 
of monies currently paid to the EU, ‘the re-establishment of full 
Parliamentary democracy as a result of Brexit’. 
A little over 6% of 
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Respondents who anticipated negative impacts from Brexit tended 
to show much less confidence in the current democratic system or 
the representation of Northern Ireland’s views in the Executive or in 
Westminster. 
As in the answers to the previous question on whether they would be 
personally affected by Brexit, Leave voters were disproportionately 
represented in those believing that Brexit would have no effect on 
their local community. One respondent argued that border roads 
could be closed as a result of Brexit but that ‘Minor roads are open 
but very rarely used after 10 years except by locals’ (#7, M, Mid 
Ulster). A very different view was given by a different respondent: 
‘I live in a location which was marginalized by its locations for 
years due to the border and increasing cross-border traffic is 
important to ensure my location will be given an opportunity to 
flourish’ (#88, M, Leitrim). 
Leave voters were 
disproportionately 
represented in 
those believing that 
Brexit would have 
no effect on their 
local community.
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4.2.3. Effect of change in 
UK/Ireland relations
Fig. IV. vi. Responses to Q.21. How much do you think a different relationship between 
Ireland and the UK would affect you?
Comparing answers to the question on the anticipated effect of 
changes in UK/Ireland relations to others, it is clear that respondents 
were not so agitated by the prospect of a change in UK/Ireland 
relations as they were by Brexit (although a few respondents saw 
no distinction between the two processes). Nor was the answer 
greatly affected by whether a respondent lived in Northern Ireland 
or the Republic of Ireland. UK/Ireland relations, for many, meant 
London-Dublin relations, and they considered the Border Region to 
be on the very margins of those circles. 
The sense is that the whole of Northern Ireland is suffering from 
a lack of representation whilst the devolved institutions are not 
properly functioning. When combined with the particular needs of 
Northern Ireland that may not necessarily match the priorities of the 
UK (especially as regards the Border Region), this deepened the 
sense of voicelessness of some:
UK/Ireland 
relations, for 
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‘If I were talking to Michel Barnier I would say: make sure you give 
a voice to citizens here, especially EU nationals living in Northern 
Ireland. I don’t think we’re going to have a voice in Northern 
Ireland for a very long time. The British Government isn’t going to 
do that… someone has to.’ (1.40.50)
A repeated concern rested on the vulnerability of Northern Ireland 
in wider geopolitics:
‘Living in Northern Ireland we are at the liberty of how these 
countries deal with one another, I fear we will become a bargaining 
chip.’ (#299, F, South Down)
‘Direct rule from Westminster would mean people who don’t know 
much about Northern Ireland and who don’t particularly seem to 
care about it would be ruling it from across the sea. I’m not a fan 
of this.’ (#47, M, Mid Ulster)
A lack of trust in Direct Rule from Westminster has been exacerbated 
by what has happened since the Brexit referendum vote. The vote 
in the House of Commons on the triggering of Article 50 contributed 
to such concerns:
‘I am also disturbed that Westminster voted against Amendment 86, 
which would have protected the Good Friday Agreement during Brexit -- 
effectively, MPs voted to break the GFA.’ (#285, F, Fermanagh and Omagh)
Beyond Northern Ireland, there is a sense in which there has been a 
decline in relationships between the UK and Ireland since the Brexit 
vote. Some respondents south of the Irish border expressed this in 
terms of a new discomfort in their personal impressions of the UK: 
‘I have a lot of friends and family in UK and visit regularly. I feel 
less positive towards UK now and I feel don’t have the option to 
move or work there’ (#38, F, Sligo)
‘Not going there anymore...’ (#60, F, Cavan)
This indicates that the conduct of politics at the highest levels clearly 
has an effect on personal decisions and views at the micro level.
A repeated concern 
rested on the 
vulnerability of 
Northern Ireland in 
wider geopolitics:
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give a voice to 
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4.3. The views of 
Leave voters
4.3.1. The Leave-
voting respondents
Given that only a small portion of our respondents voted to 
Leave (8%), it is worthwhile giving a particular space to consider 
patterns and themes in responses from these participants. The 
small proportion of Leave voters in our sample reflects the fact that 
42% of our respondents live in the Republic of Ireland and were 
not eligible to vote. We may speculate that the disproportionate 
representation of Remain voters in this cohort reflects a greater 
agitation about Brexit among that group than with Leave voters, but 
this is impossible to prove in this study. 
Among the Leave voting respondents, there were a small 
proportion who have changed their mind about voting for Brexit. 
In most cases this is because of the feeling that they were misled 
during the referendum campaign: ‘all the claims made before [the] 
referendum were unfounded’ (#39, Fermanagh, male) and ‘[I] was 
not given full facts in [the] referendum’ (#225, Male, Monaghan). 
That said, among all our Leave voting respondents, there is an 
almost 50/50 divide between those who do not believe that they 
are very informed about the topic and those that state that they are 
very informed. Most information they gather on Brexit has come 
through the media, although they question the accuracy of the 
information that is given through the media. The overall impression 
of the views of Leave voters is the same as that of all our other 
respondents, i.e. that nobody can really know what the fallout of 
Brexit will be until the Brexit negotiations in Brussels are concluded. 
a small proportion 
who have changed 
their mind about 
voting for Brexit.
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4.3.2. Why respondents 
voted Leave
The reasons that most Leave respondents give for voting for Brexit 
was the reduction of ‘red tape’:
‘The reduction of “red tape”, retention of monies currently paid 
to the EU and re-establishment of full Parliamentary democracy 
as a result of Brexit will have considerable positive advantages.’ 
(#18, M, Fermanagh)
‘Less red tape and interference in daily life and more trade with 
the wider world’ (#88, M, Fermanagh and Omagh)
‘For over 35 years I have been plagued by European legislation 
in the workplace. Our growth has been restricted. Entrepreneurial 
spirit and energies of the working man has been suffocated and 
blighted by faceless and uninformed and dis-interested political 
buffoons in Brussels. I have worked tirelessly to see the day that 
we could rid ourselves of such influences.’ (#76, M, Mourne)
It is important to note that a few Remain voting respondents also 
give similar reasons as possible benefits arising from Brexit:
Perhaps there could be positives, e.g. less red tape, more 
immigration controls etc., and I have no doubt that the UK will 
eventually flourish, however the real problem in this area [Border 
Region] is that ROI stays in Europe and the U.K. Is out. (#191, M, 
Fermanagh and Omagh)
In terms of opportunities, one respondent was very explicit as to how 
Northern Ireland might benefit from the difficulties they believed Ireland 
would face as a consequence of Brexit.
reduction of 
‘red tape’.
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‘Europe will not be able to subsidize these [farming and fishing] 
industries at its existing rate of grant in the Irish Republic and as 
a result we in Northern Ireland will be much more competitive 
within the market-place. We will attract inward investment and we 
will export more. And with the Irish Republic’s economy being so 
heavily dependent upon its exports into mainland GB this too will 
be a situation that we can exploit to our financial well-being… Yes 
a Hard Border [sic] will benefit us greatly. I look forward to it.’ (#76, 
M, Mourne)
In the main, however, Leave voting respondents presented reasons that 
closely reflect the mainstream British pro-Brexit discourse:
‘It is the right of all countries to secure their borders’ (#21, M, Fermanagh 
and Omagh). 
‘Outstanding trading opportunities worldwide, reassertion of national 
sovereignty and control of immigration.’ (#18, M, Fermanagh)
The same respondent argued that a specific challenge in the Brexit 
process was: ‘To minimise the economic impact’ of Brexit on the Border 
Region, and the ‘Prevention of the EU seeking to damage the UK 
economy and limit UK sovereignty’.
Related to this is the theme of having control over one’s own borders, 
which appears to primarily mean keeping those out that they do not 
want entering. 
‘Immigration Control, Legal Control over Laws of the Land’ (#24, M, 
Fermanagh and Omagh)
‘A strong UK independent and forming its own laws for its own people. 
Strict immigration controls. Immigrants should be required to integrate 
into the community.’ (#34, M, ABC)
‘UK to govern our legislation, remove human rights and stop protecting 
the criminals, give greater protection to the victims, stop foreigners 
feeding off our benefits system and look after our people as a priority’ 
(#37, F, Fermanagh and Omagh)
no respondent 
appears to link an 
open Irish border 
to any increase 
in immigration in 
either direction
having control over 
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Despite the general anti-immigration tenor in the views of these 
respondents, it is notable that no respondent appears to link an open 
Irish border to any increase in immigration in either direction. 
4.3.3. Leave-voters’ views 
of the post-Brexit border
Our Leave-voting respondents were less likely to cross the border on a 
frequent basis than Remain respondents, and when they do so, it is for 
specific reasons, such as youth group outings, fuel or going to Dublin 
Airport: ‘I very rarely cross the border so it wouldn’t directly affect me.’ 
(#130, M, ABC). That said, it is the case that some Leave voting respondents 
were directly involved in activities that are likely to be directly affected by 
Brexit. One stated he had ‘Work, family and business on both sides of the 
border’ (#88). 
There were some exceptions to this, with two respondents in this category 
expressing concerns about future difficulty in crossing the border for work 
and sales, which they currently do at the moment. That said, they seem 
less concerned about the resonance of the past border than Remain 
voters in this survey: 
‘Didn’t affect me when there was a border in the past, can’t see it making 
a lot of difference since that time’ (#37, F, Fermanagh and Omagh) 
‘It will just go back to the old times’ (#6, M, Fermanagh and Omagh) 
That said, one slightly younger respondent described her fear of ‘intimate 
searches [and] intimidating presence’ (#46, F, ABC) if there was a return 
to a hard border. 
Leave voters are less likely to fear a hard border, not because they don’t 
cross it or see the economic value of an open border but because they do 
not believe that negotiations will result in it. Leave voting respondents, in 
response to questions about possible changes to cross-border or British-
Irish relationships queried. 
no respondent 
appears to link an 
open Irish border 
to any increase 
in immigration in 
either direction.
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‘Will it be that different?’ (#37) and ‘Why should there be a different 
relationship?’ (#24). One reason given as to why they don’t 
anticipate a harder border is because of Ireland’s position:
‘I don’t think it will make a difference as Republic of Ireland is 
greatly dependent on UK and will be eager to strike a deal to 
protect their economy’ (#10, F, ABC)
Another pointed to the vulnerable position of Ireland, seeing a hard 
border as a decision of the EU’s (at a cost to Ireland) alone:
‘The border will only be hard if the EU ‘superstate’ want this to be 
the case. The people of the UK and people of NI do not want a 
‘harder’ border …nor do the people of the RoI. It will be the EU who 
need a hard border because of their policy on Free movement of 
people and customs controls… Surely the strict imposition of this 
EU law is not in the best interests of one of its member states?’ 
(#15, M, Mid Ulster)
Their responses show that in the main, Leave voters view the 
impact of Brexit on the border controls as being primarily a matter of 
restricting immigration. Hence the response, when asked whether 
a harder border would affect him, ‘There might be a few delays at 
busy times of the year but worthwhile for the benefits of security 
and immigration.’ (#16, M, Fermanagh). That said, it is quite clear 
that even the Leave voting respondents were neither voting for nor 
expecting a ‘hard’ Irish border, and a number state that they do 
not wish to see such a thing. Indeed, one Leave voting respondent 
states that he wishes to see ‘an open border for the movement of 
people and business’ (#88).
even the Leave 
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5.1. Information 
on Brexit
5.1.1. Uncharted territory
In response to the question ‘How informed do you think you are 
about the possible impact of Brexit on your daily life?’ the average 
answer indicated that most people felt fairly informed (3.5 on Likert 
scale). Residence on one side of the border or another does not 
appear to be very significant here.
Fig. IV. vii. Responses to Q. 13. How informed do you think you are about the possible 
impact Brexit may have on your daily life? (Likert scale)
The comments given show that most people get their information 
from media coverage. There are some concerns that the 
information can be limited and inconsistent. This can mean that 
news can exacerbate people’s sense of uncertainty about the 
topic: ‘Sometimes there can be conflicting information which is 
hard to understand’ (#16, F, Monaghan). Respondents also raised 
news can 
exacerbate 
people’s sense 
of uncertainty
most people get 
their information 
from media 
coverage.
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the issue of doubting any information put out until the process of 
the negotiations was clearer:
‘Lots of speculation and guesswork with very few/no hard facts 
available!” (#13, Derry, Female)
‘The NI border issue: we need facts, not speculation.’ (#223)
In other circumstances, people may turn to political leaders for 
guidance but there is some cynicism in that regard, at least until 
there is some clarity from the direction of the negotiations.
‘There is a lot of nonsense being spouted by politicians who don’t 
know what they are talking about. Until the deal is done no one 
knows.’ (#34, M, Armagh)
Indeed, a general theme coming through is that the circumstances 
make it difficult to be anything other than uncertain: ‘No one’s fault 
that the information is limited, there is just so many unknowns. It’s 
uncharted territory.’ (#31, M, Donegal). One focus group participant 
explained this well:
‘The problems could be zero or could be 100. Until the horse-
trading starts, we don’t know what the outcome is going to be –’ 
(3.5.58)
This means that there is a fear that the dangers will be worse than 
anticipated because they have not been adequately prepared for:
‘While I have read some of the arguments presented from both 
sides there appears to be so much unknown that the risks will 
potentially be greater than even expected.’ (#104, M, Mid Ulster)
A focus group in Monaghan picked up on the risks involved in this 
lack of preparation:
‘Very few businesses, something like 98% are not even thinking 
about it, which is probably a message as well. It’s a message 
around the confusion and lack of certainty.’ (1.39.25)
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Indeed, some consider that information has limits to its usefulness 
anyway: ‘It’s going to happen; knowing about it will not change 
things’ (#18, M, Armagh) and another described himself as 
‘Intentionally uninformed. Too many variables to try and assess. 
The sun will still rise in the morning and set in the evening.’ (#35, 
M, Leitrim). Others question as to whether information can be 
trustworthy or whether it can only, at best, be ‘opinions of journalists 
and others’ (#48, M, Fermanagh and Omagh). As one respondent 
stated:
‘Many relevant questions have been asked but only some of the 
relevant facts relating to the answer are provided, depending on 
which side of the argument the person is on.’ (#132, M, Mid Ulster)
A couple of other Leave voters commented on what they perceived 
to be a pro-European bias of journalists currently writing on the 
impact of Brexit. 
Quite a number of respondents made a connection between the 
current uncertainty around the future of the Irish border and the 
‘political crises in the UK’ (#49, F, Fermanagh and Omagh), the 
lack of a NI Executive (#65, M, Cavan) and the lack of preparedness 
prior to the referendum (#56, F, Monaghan). One focus group 
participant commented on the referendum experience in Northern 
Ireland in that regard:
‘But there was a lot of publicity, a lot of involvement and Northern 
Ireland was very much involved in the talks before we voted. We 
got a lot of information from the BBC, UTV… there was too much! I 
think what the problem was that people buried their heads in the 
sand thinking it’ll never go through.’ (1.13.45)
Some commended the levels of information available from various 
sources (though not official sources) but these respondents seemed 
to be particularly motivated to find out more, usually because of a 
particular business or personal interest in the subject (e.g. #29, #42, 
#52, #113). Others argued that these were insufficient.
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‘I don’t have much of an interest in politics but would like to know 
more about the potential impacts of Brexit.’ (#50, F, Fermanagh 
and Omagh)
‘Until such time as the average person receives very clear and 
proven facts through the letterbox or through approved media 
routes, the possible impact of Brexit will mean that most of the 
border population remain uninformed. Currently it is ‘hearsay’ with 
no proof behind it and therefore a degree of separation remains.’ 
(#80, F, Cavan)
This view was repeated in the focus groups. There was a discussion 
in one that exemplified the paradox of the situation: on the one 
hand ‘everyone is talking about Brexit’ and yet on the other ‘we’re 
not getting information’ (3.1.34; 5.58). 
‘Not knowing is the worst. Nobody knows what the impact of 
Brexit is going to be. It is not possible for them to judge what kind 
of problems there will be because of Brexit. There might be none 
and they might be immense.’ (3.1.34)
There was an expressed wish for information:
‘Any sort of clarity would be a starting point. If there was any sort 
of plan, as opposed to just limbo which it has been for a while.’ 
(2.26.33)
All of this comes back to the uncertainty about the future 
arrangements and implications for the Border Region. In the 
meantime, ‘We do not know yet. Up ‘til now politics is entirely in 
“guessing and assuming” mode. Not healthy.’ (#3, M, Donegal). 
When invited to describe their views on Brexit in one to three words, 
the word that came up most frequently of all among our focus group 
respondents was ‘uncertainty’. 
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5.2. Priorities 
5.2.1. Political uncertainty
In response to the survey question on what the priorities should 
be for the Border Region in the Brexit negotiations, a number of 
respondents gave answers that may be viewed as ‘political’. Yet 
few of these were what might be termed staunchly Unionist or 
Nationalist; instead, there were critical reflections on the future 
stability of the United Kingdom in light of the nationalisms unleashed 
by Brexit (English and Scottish as well as Irish) and on the future 
relationship of trust between Britain and Ireland. 
These comments from someone describing himself as a British 
Unionist Remain voter express a particular sense of vulnerability, 
being concerned that Brexit will induce a rise of nationalism in 
Ireland and the UK that undermines the Union whilst at the same 
time having no representation of his views by a political party 
in Westminster: 
‘As someone who identifies as British I am beginning to question 
just how much a UK Conservative Government really cares for or 
understands the situation here in Northern Ireland ...I believe that 
leaving the EU will prove the biggest threat to Northern Ireland’s 
settled constitutional position and that of the UK as a whole. …
without any other mainstream British political parties standing for 
election here I feel that my vote is worthless at Westminster and 
I am beginning to imagine for the first time in my life just what a 
United Ireland would look like and how Unionist Remainers may 
have more of a voice and a lot more in common with our Southern 
Friends.’ (#211, M, Fermanagh and Omagh)
Whilst it is not unusual for residents in the Border Region to protest 
that the UK and Irish governments pay it too little attention, this 
feeling appears to be exacerbated by Brexit. 
‘...I believe that 
leaving the EU will 
prove the biggest 
threat to Northern 
Ireland’s settled 
constitutional 
position and that of 
the UK as a whole...’
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This is in part because of the array of possible Brexit outcomes that 
may yet cause harm to the Region; even Leave voting respondents 
did not suggest many opportunities that would bring particular 
benefits to the Region through Brexit. The sense of Northern 
Ireland being ‘between’ the Republic and Great Britain is even more 
acute for the Border Region, which is literally at the edge of the two 
jurisdictions. As one respondent put it:
‘People down the country talk about ‘The border areas’ and 
our business without really understanding how much our area 
is struggling as it is. There should be more effort made by the 
government and the media, as well as the UK citizens, to 
understand our plight and that of the North.’ (#261, F, Monaghan)
5.2.2. Peace process
‘The UK leaving the EU will plunge my life into uncertainty. …I also 
worry about the threat of violence if a hard border is imposed as a 
result of Brexit.’ (#287, F, Fermanagh and Omagh)
Respondents’ priorities for the Brexit negotiations (including Leave 
voters) centre on the need to keep a ‘frictionless’ border. This is 
connected to the over-riding concern to protect the peace process. 
A number of respondents used the analogy of a hardening border 
reopening old wounds:
‘It places barriers between our County and the rest of the 6 
counties. It raises old wounds and attitudes that were prevalent 
during the “Troubles”. It is not good for the Peace Process.’ 
(#237, M, Monaghan)
‘The UK leaving the 
EU will plunge my 
life into uncertainty. 
…I also worry 
about the threat of 
violence if a hard 
border is imposed 
as a result of Brexit.’
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Fig. V. i. Responses to Q.23. What do you believe should be the priority outcomes from 
Brexit negotiations for you and the community you live in?
5.2.3. Agriculture
The practicalities of cross-border movement (and the mundane 
reasons for this) really come to the fore in people’s responses to 
the anticipated effects of a harder border, especially with regard 
to farming and agriculture. This is important, given that free 
movement of agricultural products are not as a rule included in 
free trade agreements or customs unions with the EU for non-EU 
member-states.
‘From Donegal to Dundalk there are farmers that have land on 
both sides of the border. During The Troubles, they had to travel 
maybe 30 miles to get back around to a field. There are probably 
10k pigs a week going from my county [Cavan] to Cookstown for 
slaughter. The milk is usually going the other way – from north to 
south. No-one takes any notice of it and it’s only when something 
would happen, you’d think, “I never thought of that…”‘ (3.32.50)
A number of respondents commented on the fact that farming now 
is far more complicated – and the agricultural markets and supply 
chains far more integrated –than at the time there was a harder 
border. This makes the anticipation of a post-Brexit border all the 
more concerning:
Section 5: Looking Ahead 
Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 81
‘There are so many regulations around farming now. Previously, 
when the border roads would have been closed, there was less 
bureaucracy and red tape. Now it’s all traceability, far more 
bureaucracy with it. It’s going to be massively difficult with splitting 
up two farms in two jurisdictions.’ (3.33.50)
The personal impact of such changes are expressed in the survey 
in quite poignant ways.
‘It would completely destroy my farming enterprise in that as a 
suckler cow farmer and sheep farmer my outlet for product would 
be absolutely restricted… Brexit will end my farming enterprise 
[from] which I and preceding generations have lived relatively 
comfortably. [It is now] coming to an abrupt end’. (#258, M, Mid 
Ulster)
That said, even though the Common Agricultural Policy provides 
for an important source of income for the vast majority of farmers 
on the island, it was one of the issues of concern that was given a 
lower ranking in the survey’s list of effects of EU membership. This 
may reflect the fact that the UK government has reassured farmers 
that it will subsidise farmers in place of CAP payments until 2020. 
5.2.4. Business and work
More immediately, respondents raised concerns about the impact 
of Brexit on businesses on both sides of the border. 
I am more concerned about the market size of some of the 
companies that operate and cross borders. Currency fluctuations, 
tariffs… all impact on businesses. We are all jumping to conclusions 
that there is going to be a hard border.’ (1.11.30)
Respondents comment frequently on the potential problems for 
cross-border trade and business, and the fact that some in the 
Region would have to make different choices about where they will 
live and work as a result of a harder border.
‘It’s going to be 
massively difficult 
with splitting up 
two farms in two 
jurisdictions.’
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‘The UK’s decision has impacted Ireland in terms of business 
and highlighting the fact that NI is partitioned from the rest of the 
island. Many people living in border counties will perhaps have to 
make serious decision on their workplace/country of residence… 
Economically I think cross-border businesses need a plan of what 
happens if a hard border is reality.’ (#217, F, ABC)
‘[I] live on the border and own a business… rely on northern 
trade in business’ (#221, F, Cavan)
Among business-related priorities, the themes of tourism and 
environmental protections are mentioned most frequently.
A particular Brexit-related concern for business relates to the issue 
of smuggling that comes up in several comments in response to 
the survey question about the impact of Brexit. Experience already 
shows that smuggling causes particular harm to the legal economy 
in the Border Region. A more significant economic border will mean 
greater incentives for smuggling. As well as causing a difficulty for 
policing, at one level this also places some legitimate businesses in 
the area at a competitive disadvantage. 
‘Black market economy and illegal behaviour is going to sky 
rocket again – back to the dark days again. People trying to make 
a genuine € or £ are subsumed by the illegal activity, illegally 
procured goods, people avoiding tariffs, avoiding controls whether 
it is digital or a hard border. People going through fields. People 
registering cattle on one side and registering on another. Back to 
the fuel laundering. All that stuff will come back.’ (1.18.17)
‘I know any change to current arrangements on the border will 
result in turning the clock back 20 years, return to smuggling, etc.’ 
(#291, M, Mid Ulster)
‘A lot of people will make money out of [a customs border]. Wee 
Sammy or Paddy will be sitting back saying: “There’s that product 
and if I move it from there to there, how much can I make by bringing 
it across fields?” That would be impossible to police. (3.13.01)
A more significant 
economic border 
will mean greater 
incentives for 
smuggling.
‘...cross-border 
businesses need 
a plan of what 
happens if a hard 
border is reality.’
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A quite different dimension of Brexit-related changes that are 
already affecting business and life in the border region are felt at a 
personal level by cross-border or frontier workers. Brexit looks set to 
affect them not only in terms of changes to the economic conditions 
of work in the Border Region but also as the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU potentially affects workers’ rights, transferability of social 
security payments and mutual recognition of qualifications. The 
future position of cross-border workers is one of the most frequently 
mentioned concerns in the survey responses and a number of our 
respondents are cross-border workers. Some explained that they 
are already feeling the effects of the Brexit decision:
‘I live in ROI work in N.I cross the border at least twice daily for work. 
[I] Socialise, shop and get health care each side of the border. A 
hard border would make all that difficult and more expensive in 
time and money. The currency drop of the £ already is a huge drop 
in my money in my pocket.’ (#151, F, Monaghan)
Similar views were expressed by another cross-border worker, but 
one in the opposite situation:
‘As an EU cross-border citizen I am entitled to claim my children’s 
allowance in southern Ireland. If this is no longer the case I will lose 
out financially; this is already causing me worry and stress. As a 
working family, we cannot afford to lose this payment to receive a 
much lesser payment in the north of Ireland.’ (#192, F, Fermanagh 
and Omagh)
The greatest concern is that the process of Brexit (and the related 
disintegration of currently common frameworks) would mean that 
people would be forced to stay on one side of the border or the 
other, rather than to live cross-border lives.
‘I live in Donegal and work in Derry, very worried about hard border 
and implications to local economy in Inishowen. Already seeing 
impact with property prices and personally with falling exchange 
rate. I am considering having to sell house and move to Derry or 
change jobs.’ (#281, F, Donegal).
The future position 
of cross-border 
workers is one of 
the most frequently 
mentioned 
concerns in the 
survey responses 
and a number of 
our respondents 
are cross-border 
workers. Some 
explained that they 
are already feeling 
the effects of the 
Brexit decision.
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5.2.5. Citizenship 
and migration
Most often mentioned in the responses concerning the prospect 
of a hard(er) border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland is the expectation that this border would lead to delays and 
that crossing the border would generally become more difficult. 
More broadly, there is an anticipation that there will be change in 
the treatment of – and discrimination between – different types 
of citizens. There were many mentions of fears about diverging 
experiences of Irish citizens on either side of the border. 
‘What will the position of Irish citizens in the North be? Will the 
guarantees of the Good Friday Agreement with respect to 
citizenship rights continue to be respected? How will Irish passport 
holders who live in the UK be treated in the South of Ireland and 
the rest of the EU post Brexit? Will we still be considered as full EU 
citizens with the same rights?’ (#96, M, Mid Ulster)
‘It is going to separate us further from our fellow Irish citizens 
on the other side of the border, through the proliferation of 
a multitude of daily obstacles, some visible, some invisible.’ 
(#202, M, Strabane-Derry)
There were also concerns raised about the position of non-British 
and non-Irish citizens in the Border Region. Some viewed controls 
on migration as causing problems for the sustainability of some 
businesses (particularly in the hospitality sector) in the Region. This 
is a concern to both sides of the border:
‘I know back home [Cavan] if you hadn’t the foreigners [sic], 
a lot of places would close down. Even the hotels, it would be 
massive.’ (3.35.18)
‘Rights to travel, live and work between EU regions for residents 
here or for people from other regions wanting to work here - 
people and expertise we need such as medical and healthcare.’ 
(#250, F, British and Irish, Fermanagh and Omagh)
concerns raised 
about the position 
of non-British and 
non-Irish citizens in 
the Border Region.
fears about 
diverging 
experiences of Irish 
citizens on either 
side of the border.
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Another broader concern relates to the question of potential effects 
on immigration and migrant communities in Northern Ireland. 
Some specifically named the risk of increased ‘race hatred’ and 
‘racist profiling’ (1.30.05), noting it has particular connotations and 
difficulties in a place that has experienced ethnonational conflict 
of this type. One other pertinent point in relation to migration: a 
number of respondents comment that the Brexit vote has made 
them think differently about their plans for moving across the UK/
Ireland border in future:
‘I wanted to move to Armagh after university but I’m not doing 
that now.’ (#261, F, Monaghan)
5.2.6. Future development
In terms of future concerns, many raised queries about the potential 
impact on employment and education opportunities. Some of the 
younger survey respondents commented thus:
‘Considering I plan on doing some schooling in Belfast, it [Brexit] is 
extremely worrying’ (#155, M, Leitrim)
‘If I decided to study in the North that could be a massive problem.’ 
(#220, F, Cavan)
‘I will not be able to consider postgraduate study in Northern 
Ireland as I had previously thought I would’. (#108, F, Leitrim)
Such concerns clearly not only have an immediate impact in terms 
of restricting choice but also a longer term impact on the Region, 
not only in terms of educational opportunities and the knowledge 
economy but also in terms of the personal networks and social 
connections that arise through third level education. Such changes 
have implications for future generations. 
‘We’ll only start to understand what we’ve lost after we’ve lost it. 
When it’s too late.’ (1.47.27)
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5.2.7. Opportunities
Some opportunities were expressed in vivid form in terms of political 
preferences, among which ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland 
appears the most prevalent but (as one would expect) there are 
strongly expressed views for other outcomes too. For those seeing 
direct opportunities arising from Brexit, by far the majority centred 
on the idea of free trade outside the EU:
‘We have to make the most of what we’ve got. We now will be an 
independent country that has traded for hundreds and hundreds 
of years and led the industrial revolution; we should be fit to make 
good deals with countries outside of Europe. It’s going to be 
difficult. We need strong negotiations with other countries …there 
is a wider world out there. (2.2.55) 
‘The world’s a big place, there is an opportunity…we can go and 
make our own trade deals. The money that we were putting into 
Europe will become available; we would want to get some of those 
funds.’ (3.51.10)
It is notable that none of these talk in particular about Northern Ireland 
but about the UK as a whole as a beneficiary of such opportunities. 
Those who do see opportunities for Northern Ireland seemed to 
see these as coming at the expense of the Republic of Ireland.
‘Citizens in the Irish Republic will be faced with considerable 
trading difficulties due to their close ties on the economic front 
with mainland GB and within 3 to 5 years they may well have to 
make their own decision as to whether or not they stay in Europe 
or choose to leave. In the immediate future, the opportunity for 
financial gains will be ours in Northern Ireland, provided we work 
and take advantage of such opportunities.’ (#76, M, Mourne)
The same is true of respondents in the Republic of Ireland who 
see benefits for the Border Region from Brexit, i.e. it comes at the 
expense of the UK/Northern Ireland:
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‘Companies currently with HQs in UK/NI will look for a presence 
here to maintain EU access’ (#304 Sligo)
‘Opportunities for businesses to locate from North to South to take 
advantage of free EU market’ (#228, F, Fermanagh and Omagh)
This is worrying, given that these opportunities are seen in terms 
of back-to-back development or competition between the two. 
But again, in the main, comments return to the uncertainty of the 
present climate. 
There are unforeseen things; this is all ‘cloud in the sky’ guessing 
but for our local area exporting outside of Northern Ireland is 
already complicated. If that becomes more complicated, then the 
opportunities out of it will be difficult to see. The opportunities will 
come, but will they come for everybody? I’m not so sure. (2.32.10) ‘The opportunities 
will come, but 
will they come 
for everybody? 
I’m not so sure.’
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5.3. Conclusion
5.3.1. The implications of Brexit 
for the Central Border Region
What effect has their common membership of the European Union 
had on the land border between the UK and Ireland? First and 
foremost, it has brought about the normalisation and de-politicisation 
of cross-border cooperation. A pragmatic approach to cross-border 
cooperation has steadily become more common in the Central 
Border Region, regardless of political or cultural affiliation. This is not 
to say EU membership has effected a process of de-nationalisation 
(British Unionist and Irish Nationalist views on the EU remain starkly 
different), but the practical benefits of cross-border cooperation 
have been recognised by politicians of all backgrounds, especially 
at the level of local authorities in border areas. 
In economic terms, UK and Irish membership of the EU Single 
Market has removed customs tariffs, harmonised regulation and 
indirect taxation, and created a more level playing field for trade 
and competitiveness across the border. The Republic of Ireland 
is Northern Ireland’s most important export partner outside the 
UK. Cross-border trade is of growing importance to the Northern 
Ireland economy, and has become a particularly important stepping 
stone for the SME-dominated private sector in Northern Ireland to 
explore export markets. Such growth has been aided by EU financial 
contributions towards major cross-border infrastructural projects 
(such as in the Belfast-Dublin rail and road corridor).
Input from European Cohesion policies and funding has been 
concentrated in particular in the Border Regions, helping to ensure 
that they do not fall further behind the central hubs of economic 
growth in the Single Market. In terms of daily experience, common 
EU citizenship for British and Irish citizens has provided benefits 
above and beyond pre-existing UK/Ireland arrangements, such as 
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supranational rights, harmonised protective employment legislation, 
the Treatment Abroad scheme, and protections for frontier workers. 
The changes to cross-border cooperation that may arise as a 
result of Brexit thus not only have symbolic resonance but also 
starkly concrete implications; these are most keenly felt in the 
Border Region.
For our respondents, their predominant hope (whether they be Leave 
or Remain voters) was that there would be minimal disruption and 
change to the border as it is currently experienced. Respondents 
picked up on the sensitivities in the language used in this matter. 
One spoke for a number when suggesting:
‘Special status, or whatever term all sides can live with that 
delivers a bespoke deal for businesses allowing them to continue 
to trade freely with EU markets and to trade across the border.’ 
(#96, M Mid Ulster)
When considering what would be needed to help navigate the 
changes ahead, many mentions were made of ‘funding’ (including 
making it ‘easier to access’ than is currently the case for EU 
funding). Some specifically mentioned the importance of policies 
for rural development in the Central Border Region. Meeting these 
new policy challenges will be a task for politicians and officials at all 
levels of governance, including local representatives. 
5.3.2. Representing the 
Central Border Region
‘I think people are talking. Who is listening?’ (#154, Sligo)
Local representatives told us that they mainly get their information 
on Brexit from the media such as television, radio and newspaper 
articles. Some have also had the opportunity to attend conferences 
organised by independent organisations (e.g. the Centre for Cross 
Border Studies), but the overriding impression was that they feel 
hugely under-informed. 
predominant hope 
(whether they be 
Leave or Remain 
voters) was that 
there would be 
minimal disruption 
and change to 
the border as 
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This is a particular problem given that residents in the Border Region 
are likely to turn to their local representatives for more information 
and guidance on Brexit. There is thus a major information deficit 
that has a multiplier effect when it comes to local representatives 
when combined with the general sense of uncertainty and ill-
preparedness for Brexit. Local representatives consequently find 
themselves in a Catch-22 situation in that they recognise the need 
for proper preparation for the impact of Brexit in their areas but they 
don’t want to exacerbate fears among their local constituents, not 
least because this can be politically incendiary when it relates to 
the border. 
One way of managing this is to ensure that local constituents become 
informed as to what is not likely to happen. The specific historical 
experiences of the Border Region, combined with the differing 
positions on Brexit taken by political parties in Northern Ireland, 
means that rumours and anxieties about cross-border relations can 
be used to further polarise communities. It is vitally important that 
facts and information are given directly to citizens so as to allay fears. 
For example, many of our respondents associated Brexit with the 
possibility of the introduction of passport controls along the border. 
We know from the UK Government Position paper on Northern 
Ireland/Ireland and the publications of the EU Commission that such 
controls are extremely unlikely to be required. It is important that 
this information is distributed to constituents. This is particularly vital 
for residents of the Border Region – not just because they will be so 
directly affected by any significant change and will need to prepare 
for it, but also because these residents are so particularly aware of 
the negative effects of a ‘hard’ border. 
‘If something is imposed on people who don’t want it – then you’re 
talking big trouble.’ (1.22.22)
The recent experience of a very hard Irish border has created a 
profound awareness in the Border Region of the damage that can 
be caused by circumstances that affect the symbolic and practical 
manifestation of the border. As such, representation was a theme 
or ideal that many respondents viewed as being appropriate for 
It is vitally 
important that facts 
and information 
are given directly 
to citizens so as 
to allay fears.
don’t want to 
exacerbate fears 
among their local 
constituents.
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the nature of these challenges, wishing to see a future situation in 
which ‘decisions are devolved down to a local level’. Meeting the 
particular needs of the Central Border Region, then, is seen as a 
challenge that requires proper representation. This would need to 
be acknowledged and steered from local political forums as well as 
at higher levels. 
‘If Brexit does go through, I think people locally would be a lot 
more accepting if their concerns and their fears were dealt with 
by politicians at a local, national and European level. If conditions 
were put in that come from Monaghan, come from Donegal – they 
would be a lot more accepting of the inevitable if they knew their 
concerns had helped to formulate policy.’ (1.34.11)
Now is not a time to pull back from funding cross-border bodies and 
groups but a time to invest in them and draw upon their knowledge 
and experience.
This study set out to record the views of residents in the Irish 
Central Border Region as those most exposed to the changes that 
may come as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It is clear 
that the anticipation of change, combined with uncertainty as to 
the future, means that Brexit is already having an impact on people 
on both sides of the border. Even more than EU membership, the 
way that the border is experienced today is seen primarily as an 
achievement of the peace process. It is thus extremely important 
that, throughout the Brexit process, the EU and UK government 
continue to maintain their shared principles of upholding the 1998 
Agreement, protecting the peace process and avoiding a hard 
border. In seeking to realise these principles in their negotiations, 
they hold immense and direct responsibility for the future prospects 
of the Border Region as a place of stability, growth and peace.
Meeting the 
particular needs of 
the Central Border 
Region, then, is 
seen as a challenge 
that requires proper 
representation.
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Appendix 1: Information 
flyer for online survey
Have your say
An initiative of the Irish Central Border Area Network, working with Queen’s University Belfast
10 Minute survey focusing on the Central Border Region 
areas of Armagh City Banbridge and Craigavon; Cavan; 
Donegal; Fermanagh and Omagh; Leitrim; Mid Ulster; 
Monaghan; and Sligo
Survey opens 22 May 2017 and closes 30 June 2017
www.tinyurl.com/QUBICBAN
Brexit and the Central Border Region: 
Views from rural communities
Amid the uncertainty about the future of the UK’s 
relationship with the European Union, one thing is clear: the 
Irish border region will be most directly affected by Brexit:
With this in mind, ICBAN - the cross border group for the area know as the 
Central Border Region - together with a small team from Queen’s University 
Belfast are conducting a community engagement research project on the 
impact of Brexit, with a particular emphasis on the opinions of the rural 
communities in the Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland.
The project is non-political and non-partisan; we want to gather the views 
of local people whose voices otherwise tend not to be heard, therefore 
all the data from the survey and focus groups will be kept anonymous.
The results of this project will be compiled in a final project report, 
summarised in a blog and on www.icban.com. We will ensure your voices 
are carried forward and brought to the attention of the governments 
of the United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as the European Union.
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Appendix 2:  
Questionnaire for 
online survey
1. Age range
a. Under 18
b. 18-30
c. 31-45
d. 46-65
e. 66+
2. Gender
a. Male
b. Female
c. Prefer not to say
3. Citizenship
a. British
b. Irish
c. Both British and Irish
d. Other dual citizenship
e. Other EU
f. Other international
g. Prefer not to say
4. Area of residence
a. Armagh City Banbridge and 
Craigavon Borough Council
b. Cavan County Council
c. Donegal County Council
d. Fermanagh and Omagh District Council
e. Leitrim County Council
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f. Mid Ulster District Council
g. Monaghan County Council
h. Sligo County Council
i. Other
5. Occupational status
a. Full-time
b. Part-time
c. Student
d. Retired
e. Not in paid employment
6. Is your primary occupation directly connected 
to agriculture or rural affairs?
a. Yes
b. No
7. How did you vote in the referendum on the 
UKs membership of the EU in June 2016?
a. Leave
b. Remain
c. Abstained
d. Did not have a vote
e. Prefer not to say
8. How often do you cross the border
a. Several times a day
b. Daily
c. At least once a week
d. At least once a fortnight
e  At least monthly
f. At least quarterly
g. Occasionally
h. Rarely
i. Not at all
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9. How frequently do you cross the border, and what for? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 Choose between Not at all; Very rarely; Rarely;  
Occasionally; Frequently; Very frequently
a. Work / Business
b. Social / Family
c. Education / Studies
d. Shopping / Retail
e. Holiday travel
f. Healthcare
g. Sports / Entertainment
h. Other
10. If you answered ‘other’ in the previous question, please 
elaborate here. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
11. How much do you think a ‘harder’ border between 
Ireland and Northern Ireland would affect you? 
Likert scale 1 to 5, 1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much
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12. Please elaborate on your answer to the previous question. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
13. How informed do you think you are about the 
possible impact Brexit may have on your daily life? 
Likert scale 1 to 5, 1 = Very uninformed; 5 = Very informed
14. Please elaborate on your answer to the previous question. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
15. In what ways does EU membership currently affect you 
and your household? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
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 Choose between Not at all; Very little; A fair 
amount; Quite a lot; To a great extent
a. Work / Business
b. Trade / Single Market
c. Cross-border workers’ protections and rights
d. Consumer protection
e. Environmental protection
f. Common Agricultural Policy / Farming
g. Fisheries Policy
h. Education / Training
i. Shopping / Retail
j. Holiday travel
k. EU funding
l. EU citizenship rights
m. Other
16. If you answered ‘other’ in the previous question, please 
elaborate here. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
17. How much do you think the UK 
leaving the EU will affect you? 
Likert scale 1 to 5, 1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much
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18. Please elaborate on your answer to the previous question. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
19. How much do you think the UK leaving the EU 
will affect your local community and region? 
Likert scale 1 to 5, 1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much
20. Please elaborate on your answer to the previous question. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
21. How much do you think a different relationship 
between Ireland and the UK would affect you? 
Likert scale 1 to 5, 1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much
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22. Please elaborate on your answer to the previous question. 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
23. What do you believe should be the priority outcomes from 
Brexit negotiations for you and the community you live in? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
24. What opportunities do you believe will be forthcoming as 
a result of the UK leaving the EU? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
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25. Are there any specific challenges or concerns you would 
wish to highlight for attention as a result of the UK leaving 
the EU? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
26. What impact might Brexit have on your future plans? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
27. Are there any particular questions relating to the impact 
of Brexit that you feel are not currently being addressed 
and which you would like to see more information on? 
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................  
 
 .....................................................................................................
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Appendix 3: 
Interview schedule 
for focus groups
Q1 Can you describe Brexit in one sentence / a few words? 
Q2 Do you cross the border more now than you used to in the 
past (e.g. post-Agreement)? What made the difference? 
Q3 What would be a deciding factor in making you less likely 
to cross the border? 
Prompt: E.g. approved roads, stopping 
points, price divergence?
Probe: For you / your company (if applicable) / your 
community / or the sector you work in?
Q4 Do you see Brexit as being relevant to the peace process/
Agreement? 
Prompt: Cross-border bodies? Economy? Stability?
Probe: Examples? Reasons why it is not relevant?
Appendices
Views From Local Communities In The Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland 103
Q5 Is there anything positive to come from Brexit?
Prompt: What are the opportunities for you / your 
community / (Northern) Ireland / your business 
(if applicable) when it comes to Brexit?
Probe: Will these benefits compensate the possible 
downsides? How could they be secured? 
Q6 We know a key priority in the negotiations is the 
Irish border/ unique circumstances of NI. What is 
the key message that you would like to get across 
from the Border Region to the negotiators?
Prompt: What do you think are the unique issues in the 
Border Region that could get overlooked by a 
more general focus on the island of Ireland/UK?
Q7 Is there anything else you would like to 
discuss that has not been touched upon in 
either the survey or this focus group?
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